Global Governance of Science:Report of the Expert Group on Global Governance of Scienceto the Science, Economy and Society Directorate,Directorate-General for Research, European Commission by Andanda, Pamela et al.
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Global Governance of Science
Andanda, Pamela; Kaiser, Matthias; Nielsen, Linda; Stehr, Nico; Qiu, Ren-Zong
DOI:
10.2777/31776
Publication date:
2009
Document version
Også kaldet Forlagets PDF
Citation for published version (APA):
Andanda, P., Kaiser, M., Nielsen, L., Stehr, N., & Qiu, R-Z. (2009). Global Governance of Science: Report of the
Expert Group on Global Governance of Scienceto the Science, Economy and Society Directorate,Directorate-
General for Research, European Commission. Luxembourg: European Commission.
https://doi.org/10.2777/31776
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
EUR 23616 EN
R
E
P
O
R
T
Global Governance of Science
Report of the Expert Group on Global Governance of Science 
to the Science, Economy and Society Directorate, 
Directorate-General for Research, European Commission
Interested in European research? 
Research*eu is our monthly magazine keeping you in touch with main 
developments (results, programmes, events, etc.). It is available in English, French, 
German and Spanish. A free sample copy or free subscription can be obtained from:
European Commission 
Directorate-General for Research
Communication Unit
B-1049 Brussels
Fax (32-2) 29-58220
E-mail: research-eu@ec.europa.eu
Internet: http://ec.europa.eu/research/research-eu
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Directorate-General for Research
Directorate L – Science, Economy and Society 
Unit L.3 – Governance and Ethics
Contact: Rene Von Schomberg
European Commission
B-1049 Brussels
E-mail: Rene.VonSchomberg@ec.europa.eu
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR RESEARCH
2009 SCIENCE, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY EUR 23616 EN
Global Governance of Science
Report of the Expert Group on Global Governance of Science 
to the Science, Economy and Society Directorate, 
Directorate-General for Research, European Commission 
Žaneta Ozoliņa, Chairwoman
Carl Mitcham and Jack Stilgoe, Rapporteurs
Members of the Expert Group
Pamela Andanda, Matthias Kaiser, Linda Nielsen, 
Nico Stehr, Ren-Zong Qiu
2LEGAL NOTICE
Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission 
is responsible for the use which might be made of the following information.
The views expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the author 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission.
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet.
It can be accessed through the Europa server (http://europa.eu).
Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication.
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009
ISBN 978-92-79-07972-6
DOI 10.2777/31776
© European Communities, 2009
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
Printed in Belgium
PRINTED ON WHITE CHLORINE-FREE PAPER
EUROPE DIRECT is a service to help you find answers 
to your questions about the European Union
Freephone number (*):
00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11
(*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers 
or these calls may be billed
3Table of Contents
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
Chapter 1. Introduction: Aspects of Science and Governance  . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
Governance in accordance with good principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
Governing globally. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
The new geography of science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
Governing inside and out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
The limits of governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
Social contexts and social contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
Governing innovation and its discontents  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
Conclusion: Towards constructive governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
Chapter 2. The Society of Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
Governing serendipity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
A spectrum of misconduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
Relevant science, critical science and interdisciplinarity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
Open science and open access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
Conclusion: Rethinking good science. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
Chapter 3. Science in Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
From communication to deliberation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
Ethical governance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
A European consensus  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
Ethics across borders   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
Non-European cultures and informed consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
The challenge of ‘ethics-free zones’  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
Science divides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
Capacity building in the developing world. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
Conclusion: Science in the globalizing society  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
Chapter 4. Conclusions and Recommendations: Towards a Vision 
of Global Governance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
Conclusions: From Europe to the world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
Modelling a reconciliation approach  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
Recommendations: In the name of global governance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
Note on the authors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
4Foreword
I am very pleased to present the Expert group report on the Global Governance of Science 
to which legal scholars, sociologists, philosophers and political scientists from Europe, 
the United States of America, China and South-Africa have contributed. 
Science is a major driving force of globalisation. The internationalisation of the European 
Union’s Framework Programme for Research and the accompanying challenges to address 
specific global aspects of The European Research Area,  such as scientific misconduct, the 
possible emergence of ‘ethics-free’ zone and intransparent forms of mandated science at the 
global level have led me to establish this Expert Group to advise the European Commission.
I can fully agree with the expert group’s approach to the matter by which they advocate 
a vision of global governance for the common good that invokes European principles of 
good governance and fundamental rights.
Jean-Michel Baer
Director Science, Economy and Society Directorate,
Directorate-General for Research
European Commission
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Summary
As a result of the Lisbon strategy adopted by the 
European Council and creation of the European 
Research Area (ERA) in 2000, science has become 
a central component of European policy discus-
sions. The expert group affirmed this significance, 
arguing that it extends beyond Europe as the geog-
raphy of science around the world changes. Indeed, 
it is our belief that as a political entity situated 
between national and global levels, with its princi-
ples of good governance, charter of fundamental 
rights and commitments to a European Research 
Area, the European Union is ideally placed to encour-
age critical reflection and undertake practical 
leadership in relation to the global governance of 
science and innovation.
Chapter one adopts a working definition of science, 
introduces issues of governance and the complex-
ities of global governance and provides some 
historical background on the emergence of con-
temporary assumptions in and approaches to 
science policy. We take science to be a social insti-
tution producing knowledge oriented towards 
action. Science is becoming more important to the 
health and wealth of nations, and has attracted 
growing public funding. But such investments call 
for global governance in two senses of the word 
‘global’: The governance of science needs to focus 
on the whole spectrum of scientific activity, from 
theory construction and basic research to techno-
logical development and innovation. Governance 
also needs to occur at levels above and beneath 
national political entities and their international 
extensions. The received linear model of science 
policy, in which investments are turned over to 
national scientific communities for autonomous 
utilization and/or market allocation, is no longer 
adequate.
The idea of global governance highlights the 
decreased salience of nation states and growing 
importance of non-governmental organizations 
and actors in all functions of governance, from set-
ting goals and norms, selecting means, regulating 
their operations and verifying results. This is par-
ticularly relevant to science, which is governed 
internally by members of the society of science and 
externally through interactions with the society 
around it. It is also a concept that gives moral ideals 
and ethical reflection more prominent roles in gov-
ernance than has customarily been the case.
Chapter two focuses on the society of science, 
considering initially how the practices of science 
(understood broadly to include medicine and 
engineering) aim to ensure quality, integrity and 
openness. Scientists commonly see themselves 
as bottom-up contributors to a social institu-
tion whose fruitful creativity is compromised by 
attempts at top-down external control. Addi-
tionally, the society of science is inherently inter-
national, making external governance even more 
problematic. But the barriers to governance in 
some strict sense need not preclude and may even 
require governance in a broader sense, including 
general guidance and public participation.
Critical reflection on the internal self-governance 
by the society of science reveals strengths and 
weaknesses. Internal governance has been remark-
ably successful in producing knowledge that builds 
capacities for action. But not all such capacities 
have been equally beneficial and self-interest some-
times contaminates self-governance. Science-based 
innovations as well as unintended consequences 
from scientifically facilitated actions have chal-
lenged cultural traditions. At least since the end of 
6World War II, even as scientists have been ever 
more effective in contributing to healthcare, eco-
nomic development and military security, concerns 
have grown about instances of fraud, misconduct, 
and questionable research practices. Although self-
governance deserves respect, especially in the light 
of the European governance principles of propor-
tionality and subsidiarity, practical limitations point 
towards a need to move from an emphasis on erad-
icating ‘bad science’ to rethinking and fostering 
‘good science.’
Chapter three turns to science in society in order to 
place the governance of science in a social context 
of changing public relationships and new geogra-
phies. It charts the rise of public participation and 
deliberative models of governance and asks how 
such models might be scaled up to the global level. 
As the power of science grows, and more science 
takes place in more places around the planet, 
harnessing its benefits and innovative applications 
while mitigating its challenges has become a key 
question for sustainable globalisation. This again 
requires attention to ethics as an aspect of govern-
ance and explores the challenges of engaging with 
moral questions across different social contexts. 
Global governance must acknowledge tensions 
between universal scientific knowledge and gen-
eral ethical principles, on the one hand, and local 
knowledge and traditional values, on the other. 
Extending ethical governance to the global level, 
global governance needs to find new ways deal 
with scientific and technological divides between 
rich and poor countries.
As articulated in a concluding chapter four, we seek 
to advance a vision of global governance for the 
common good that invokes European principles of 
good governance and fundamental rights. Global 
self-governance within science is to be affirmed, 
but self-governance is not enough. The society of 
science is ultimately responsible to the good of the 
larger society in which it exists. In a globalised 
world, this means that we must find ways to glo-
bally govern science that seek mutual respect, 
dialogue and reconciliation.
Assumptions about the means and ends of science 
currently reinforce governance systems that are in 
many instances defined by national boundaries. 
Science and innovation are currently limited by 
policies of ‘techno-nationalism’ or transnational 
corporate economic interests. Given that the big-
gest problems demand both scientific input and 
international collaboration, global governance has 
become unavoidable. At the same time, we must 
consider how the scientific community, which is 
itself an increasingly globalised network of bot-
tom-up collaboration, can contribute to good 
governance. As we think globally, we need to rec-
ognise also that the world is far from homogenous 
or flat. Local differences, local values and local 
knowledge matter. The global governance of sci-
ence therefore sharpens the argument for greater 
local participation in matters of science and sci-
ence policy, particularly in relation to issues of 
ethics. The challenge is to develop new forms of 
engagement that allow for genuine exchange of 
knowledge and values, within science and 
between scientists and the larger societies within 
which they ultimately exist.
Our recommendations are addressed not only to 
policymakers in the European Commission and 
member states, but equally to those organisations 
worldwide that sit within and around science. Our 
recommendations might most easily be interpret-
ed in the context of publicly-funded academic 
science. But we believe that they apply as well to 
the increasingly greater proportion of science and 
scientists within the private sector.
75.  ERA research should be developed to promote 
critical reflection and discussion with regard to 
both the means and ends of science – by 
means, e.g., of selective research projects and 
public activities that require interdisciplinary 
collaboration and citizen participation, includ-
ing reflection of the ways in which the principles 
of European governance and basic fundamen-
tal rights serve as appropriate and applicable 
guidelines for the practice of science.
6.  The European Union should seek to extend to 
the global level its leadership in working to har-
monize the internal and external governance of 
science across national borders – by furthering 
research and discussion on the global govern-
ance of science and seeking to develop 
appropriate protocols and their application for 
global collaboration.
  We commend the Governance and Ethics Unit 
of the Science, Economy, and Society Directo-
rate for initiating this exploration of issues 
related to the global governance of science and 
recommend that further and more extensive 
research be promoted on this topic.
Recommendations
1.  Within the society of science, practices of ethi-
cal governance should be promoted – by, e.g., 
grant activity requirements, educational 
programmes, research projects and related 
conferences or other appropriate means.
2.  Members of the society of science should be 
encouraged to become self-critical – by, e.g., 
required collaboration with complementary 
disciplines and non-scientists in order to better 
recognize the ways they are influenced by 
larger social contexts.
3.  All scientists should be required to make the 
results of their research as widely available as 
possible – by adoption of open access publica-
tion protocols.
4.  All ERA research projects, including collabora-
tions with scientists in other countries, should 
seek ways to enact basic fundamental rights of 
dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, citizens’ 
rights, and justice in ways that also seek to 
respect and learn from the social and cultural 
contexts of non-Europeans – by, e.g., expert and 
public deliberations that develop and apply 
ideals of reconciliation.
81  See, e.g., A.F. Chalmers, What Is This Thing Called Science? 3rd edition (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1999); and Leslie Stevenson and Henry Byerly, 
The Many Faces of Science: An Introduction to Scientists, Values, and Society (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000).
2  Nico Stehr, Knowledge Politics: Governing the Consequences of Science and Technology (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2005).
3  Anne Mette Kjaer, Governance (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004). See also Carolyn J. Heinrich and Lawrence E. Lynn, eds., Governance and Performance: New Perspectives 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000).
We accept that, to some extent, science is what 
scientists do. The boundaries of science can be tak-
en as those used by the scientific community itself. 
However, our view of science does take us beyond 
a simplistic notion that it exists merely to under-
stand the world. Rather, it is intertwined with 
technology, innovation, and socio-economic 
change, facilitating the creation of new possibilities. 
It is this aspect – the role that science plays in creat-
ing new futures – that raises the most pressing 
questions for governance. Indeed, we see the 
boundary between science and technology as less 
and less clear, so that our analysis encroaches upon 
activities that might otherwise be described more 
broadly as innovation. Finally, it is important to note 
that our working definition of science encompasses 
as well engineering, medicine and the social 
sciences.
Governance in accordance 
with good principles
Governance encompasses the multiple processes 
of control and management that take place within 
and between states, in public agencies and private 
firms, or in any other social organization (3). Govern-
ance involves directing or setting goals, selecting 
means, regulating their operation, and verifying 
results.
This is a view confirmed in a white paper on Euro-
pean Governance, for which ‘Governance means 
rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way 
in which powers are exercised at the European 
level, particularly as regards openness, participa-
tion, accountability, effectiveness and cohesion.’ 
Chapter 1. 
Introduction: 
Aspects of Science 
and Governance
Science has been variously defined and continu-
ously debated (1). For the purposes of this report, 
science is broadly conceived as a special kind of 
knowledge along with a distinctive set of practices 
and cultures for producing it. In accordance with 
Francis Bacon’s famous dictum that ‘knowledge is 
power,’ we can see scientific knowledge as consti-
tuting a capacity to act (2). Modern scientific 
knowledge is not simply an understanding of the 
world, but an understanding that enables people 
to intervene in and alter that world – thus manifest-
ing an orientation towards technology and 
innovation. Science is also a human activity 
enacted through distinctive social institutions, pro-
fessional organizations, government agencies, 
schools, universities and private firms. In a world in 
which to be called ‘scientific’ carries with it signifi-
cant social prestige, the precise definitions of what 
counts as science are thus hotly debated. As this 
introduction briefly explores, to talk about the gov-
ernance of science therefore raises multiple 
questions related to both the processes of science 
and its products.
For present purposes it is not necessary to offer a 
rigid definition of science as product or as practice. 
9decisions legitimated by science, but try to shape 
science according to their own interests.
In relation to science, governance can be seen as 
concerned with providing, distributing, and regulat-
ing. Governance provides funds to support some 
kinds of science over other kinds, and distributes the 
results of science to some constituencies at the 
expense of others. Yet the most obvious and conten-
tious form of governance involves regulation, the 
class of activities concerned with preventing, allow-
ing, steering and confirming a flow of events. The 
web of activities and policies that support, distribute, 
and regulate scientific processes and products make 
up systems of governance. At the national level, 
these are fairly familiar, from funding agencies to 
educational institutions and regulatory bodies, but 
in a global context things become more complex.
Governance can be ‘global’ in two senses. First, 
‘global’ can mean comprehensive, applying to all of 
science. Second, ‘global’ can indicate a crossing of 
national boundaries. To talk about ‘global govern-
ance’ in the context of international relations 
emphasizes the second sense. Global governance 
is concerned with problems that involve multiple 
countries. Yet as a technical term ‘global govern-
ance’ is distinguished from international governance. 
As one United Nations publication explains:
“In contrast to international governance, global 
governance is characterized by the decreased 
salience of states and the increased involvement of 
non-state actors in norm- and rule-setting processes 
and compliance monitoring. In addition, global gov-
ernance is equated with multilevel governance, 
meaning that governance takes place not only at 
the national and the international level… but also 
at the subnational, regio nal, and local levels. Where-
as, in interna tional governance, the addressees and 
the makers of norms and rules are states and other 
Governance thus involves a conscious decision not 
to rely simply on power politics or markets, 
although it may well include either or both. In 
democratic, pluralistic societies it will involve 
action by multiple intermediate voluntary associa-
tions, from churches to labour unions and cultural 
organizations. And good governance will seek to 
enact precisely these five principles:
•  openness, communicating accessibly with the 
public;
•  participation by citizens as much as possible in 
all policy formation;
•  accountability clearly apportioned among EU 
institutions;
•  effectiveness in achieving goals and objectives; 
•  coherence among institutions and policies.
The application of these five principles, the white 
paper further notes, promotes those of:
• proportionality,
• subsidiarity,
which are also foundational to European Union 
governance.
The implication of these principles for the good gov-
ernance of science may not always be straightforward 
but should remain a theme for reflective examina-
tion. In this regard, our report may pose as many 
questions as it presents answers. But these questions 
are vital, and our hope is that they set the agenda 
for an important debate that will determine a robust 
approach to the global governance of science.
Governing globally
Science has an ambivalent relationship with tradi-
tional national politics and policy. On the one hand, 
scientists seek recognition and financial support 
from governments; on the other, the same scientists 
can resist governmental control. Governments like-
wise are ambivalent: they aspire to have their 
● ● ●
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activity introduces new needs and challenges for 
global governance.
China, for instance, has begun the most ambitious 
science funding programme since the United 
States undertook in the 1960s its race to the moon. 
The Chinese government has set a target for invest-
ment in research and development at 87 billion 
euros by 2020, and is rapidly building capacity in 
areas of science that were previously the preserve 
of the United States, Europe and Japan. Increasing 
money is also leading to increasing numbers of 
scientists. China will add to its already formidable 
base of science and engineering graduates (4.9 mil-
lion in 2004), and will continue to attract a diaspora 
of scientists back from studies and posts abroad.
In India, the picture is more complicated, but the 
figures are still impressive: 8% economic growth 
since 2003 and a doubling in the number of patents 
since 2000. Over a twenty-year period from the late 
1980s to the early 2000s, Indian investment in bio-
technology has almost quadrupled (5). 
The rise of world class science in new places with 
incompletely-understood cultures and practices 
raises enormous challenges for governance, both in 
these countries themselves and in the global com-
munity. In addition, this is true for scientists themselves 
and for those non-scientists who are in the process 
of creating an international civil society.
Governing inside and out
Governance can be internal or external to institu-
tions. Within science, scientists themselves govern 
the production of knowledge in myriad ways (6). 
intergovernmental institutions, non-state actors…
are both the addressees and the makers of norms 
and rules in global governance (4).”
So global governance is about more than relation-
ships between states. It also focuses on the growing 
complexity of trans-state relationships. In our report, 
the term ‘global governance’ functions in this way, 
although it is recognised that in order for govern-
ance to be truly global in the transnational sense it 
must in addition be global in the sense of being 
comprehensive.
The governance of science is faced with the chal-
lenge of rapidly-advancing possibilities realized 
through research. Across borders, the societal con-
texts within which new knowledge is generated, 
distributed and regulated will vary hugely. Science 
nevertheless remains a non-state and transnational 
social institution, so that its governance is necessarily 
global, both internally and externally.
The new geography 
of science
For much of the 20th century, scientific activity was 
concentrated in a small set of countries. Since the 
last decade of the century, science and innovation 
have become increasingly and genuinely global. 
Although more science is now being done by more 
people in more places, forcing policymakers to 
expand their horizons, the distribution of growth 
remains quite uneven. In 2000, the European Union 
looked to the United States to assess its innovation 
performance. Since 2000, China, India and other 
countries have become common points of refer-
ence. Their growth in science and innovation 
4  Volker Rittberger, ed., Global Governance and the United Nations System (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001), p. 2.
5  James Wilsdon and James Keeley, China – The Next Science Superpower (London Demos, 2007); Kirsten Bound, India – The Uneven innovator (London, Demos, 2007); 
and James Wilsdon and Charles Leadbeater, The Atlas of Ideas (London, Demos, 2007).
6  These ways have been classically articulated by sociologist Robert K. Merton in ‘Science and the Social Order’ (1938) and ‘The Normative Structure of Science’ (1942), 
both included in The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, ed. Norman W. Storer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 254-285.
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specialists, communicators, teachers, regulators and 
strategic leaders.
Tensions between external and internal governance 
can lead to conflicts. Scientists may often be critical 
of external governance, insofar as it limits autonomy 
and demonstrates subordination to the public good 
– placing ‘science on tap, not on top,’ in Winston 
Churchill’s phrase. The political governance of 
science asserts society’s control of science, techno-
logy, innovation and the future. But as the authority 
of science grows, so does the risk that it becomes 
politicized, shaping and constraining political action 
or justifying inaction. As we consider the social con-
trol of science, we also need to bear in mind the 
power that science can have in and over society.
Despite the language of social control, however, 
the governance of science is not inherently pro-
hibitive. Good democratic governance opens up 
options and opportunities for the social use of new 
knowledge, rather than just closing options down 
through regulation. Civil society is not simply inter-
ested in limiting scientific activity, but in steering 
the production and use of knowledge to appro-
priate ends, be it in relation to healthcare, education, 
the environment, or any number of sectors within 
and across nations.
Many science policies are underpinned by what 
has come to be termed the linear or instrumental 
model – tracing a line from science, through tech-
nological application, to social benefits. As formu-
lated most influen tially by U.S. President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s science adviser, Vannevar Bush, the 
linear model argues that the government should 
provide scientists with resources and then allow 
scientists themselves to determine how best to 
utilize the resources with as little state interference 
as possible (7). Such a simple governance regime 
They regulate the production of knowledge by, for 
example, structured experimentation, systematic 
model construction, simulation and other methods. 
They control what counts as knowledge, through 
peer review and replication. And they manage 
how science is communicated by means of confer-
ence presentations and professional publications. 
In addition, scientists heavily influence processes 
of research funding through peer review and grant 
panels, and they guide decisions about the hiring 
and promotion of fellow scientists.
Such internal governance activities are different 
from the external governance of science by non-
scientists. External governance seeks to provide, 
regulate, and distribute science by:
1.  Upstream funding of some types of research in 
over others thus channelling scientific research 
in specific directions;
2.  Establishing rules and enforcing standards for 
people and organizations;
3.  Attaching certain attributes, such as property 
rights, to scientific knowledge and the products 
of innovation;
4.  Downstream regulation or restricting what are 
considered the misapplications and misuses of 
new science and technology; 
5.  Educating the public and encouraging debate 
about the products and processes of science.
Such efforts originate outside the scientific commu-
nity. But the specialised nature of science means 
that many scientists are also intimately involved with 
these forms of external governance. As well as citi-
zens and researchers, they may act as experts, 
7 Vannevar Bush, Science: The Endless Frontier (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Oﬃ  ce, 1945).
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knowledge or invention. Indeed, scientists them-
selves are not always able to identify the future 
opportunities and challenges presented by new 
scientific knowledge production, even if they may 
seem to be the only ones with the expertise 
required to anticipate them.
As is the case with politics and policy generally, the 
governance of science will vary across political sys-
tems. Forms of governance are not inevitable, and 
vary from place to place and time to time. Although 
the governance of science has a strong universal 
moral dimension, science poli cy will be interwoven 
with different cultural, economic and historical tradi-
tions, institutional designs and legal arrangements. 
Governance is built on relationships between 
power and science, between nation and transna-
tional organizations, between state and civil society, 
that will vary significantly among nations.
Social contexts 
and social contracts
Over the last century, aspects of the governance of 
science have attracted growing public interest. The 
distinctively modern social context is constituted 
by what is often termed a ‘social contract’ for 
science. As already noted, this is typically based in 
the linear model in which science is left to its own 
devices in the belief that it will then straight-
forwardly deliver social benefits. But this is 
a moribund social contract (9). A combination of 
internal reflection among scientists and external 
actions by civil society and states are reshaping the 
governance landscape (10). 
gives scientists significant public support and 
autonomy which, it is believed, will produce knowl-
edge that can be exploited for technical and social 
progress. Despite being revealed by social scien-
tists and philosophers as self-serving and empiri-
cally dubious (8), the model nevertheless remains 
extremely influential as a default position in sci-
ence policy discussions.
The limits of governance
Contemporary governance approaches, whether or 
not they explicitly critique the linear model, no 
longer assume that the potential benefits of science 
emerge unproblematically. It is increasingly com-
mon to prioritise scientific areas, direct techno-
logical development and boost innovation, as well 
as regulate its activity. But as more and more organ-
isations actively pursue governance agendas within 
and around science, we should be realistic about 
the limits of various approaches.
The influence and persistence of regulatory regimes, 
once established, is important, but should not be 
over-estimated. An analysis of the governance of 
scientific knowledge in the contemporary world 
reveals the practical incompleteness, fragility, obso-
lescence and often failure of attempts to govern 
science.
In addition, the tempo of science can undermine 
efforts at governance. The speed of scientific and 
technological innovation often leaves govern-
ments and the public reacting to events rather 
than responsibly governing new possibilities. Reg-
ulatory regimes can be quickly surpassed by new 
8  See, e.g., Daniel Lee Kleinman, Politics on the Endless Frontier: Postwar Research Policy in the United States (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995); and John Ziman, 
Real Science: What It Is and What It Means (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
9  Radford Byerly Jr. and Roger A. Pielke Jr., ‘The Changing Ecology of United States Science,’ Science, vol. 269 (15 Sept. 1995), pp. 1531-1532; and Jane Lubchenco, 
‘Entering the Century of the Environment: A New Social Contract for Science,’ Science, vol. 279 (23 January 1998), pp. 491-497.
10 David H. Guston, Between Politics and Science: Assuring the Integrity and Productivity of Research (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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During this same period, a cadre of biologists and 
environmental scientists were becoming increas-
ingly concerned about levels of new chemical flows 
into the natural environment. A pivotal expression 
of this concern was Silent Spring by field biologist 
Rachel Carson (13), which stimulated the emergence 
of an environmental movement and led to the 
establishment of state agencies to protect the envi-
ronment. Environmental research and regulation 
thus joined food and drug regulation as a major area 
of science and governance interaction.
Beginning in the 1970s a series of high profile tech-
nological catastrophes, airline crashes, oil spills, the 
chemical plant explosion in Bhopal, India, and the 
disaster at Chernobyl, shook public confidence in 
technological manifestations of scientific knowl-
edge and the ability of science to assess and manage 
risk (14). In the life sciences, research began to raise 
hard questions for bioethics. In one instance, a group 
of scientists called for a temporary moratorium on 
recombinant DNA research (15). Others discussed the 
more general possibility of setting “limits of scien-
tific inquiry (16)”. An existing social contract for 
science began to be questioned as a result of the 
evolving social context.
During the 1990s, concerns intensified about 
genetic engineering in food, animals and poten-
tially humans. The 1966 cloning of Dolly the sheep 
kick-started a public reaction against the potential 
cloning of human beings. Even the evolutionary 
biologist Edward O. Wilson, struggling with the 
In large measure this can be associated with a 
trajectory of public unease traceable back as far as 
World War I. During much of the 19th century, 
science progressed with little if any conscious atten-
tion to issues of internal or external governance. 
Operating independently, the scientific community 
appeared to produce new knowledge in physics, 
chemistry, geology and biology in ways that read-
ily led to new understandings of the world and 
contributed to the health and wealth of nations. The 
linear model seemed to reflect reality. World War 
I demonstrated, however, the degree to which 
science and innovation could be marshalled for 
destructive purposes  – a revelation to which World 
War II gave even more dramatic expression in Nazi 
industrialized death camps and the atomic bomb-
ings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
In response, the governance of science gradually 
became a global, public issue. In the case of medi-
cal experimentation, the medical community 
worked to both influence and internalize public 
concerns through the application of informed con-
sent in research (11). The path from the Nuremberg 
Code (1947) to the Declaration of Helsinki (origi-
nally 1964, with multiple revisions since) is illustrative. 
In response to threats from nuclear weapons, scien-
tists and engineers themselves began to question 
the way such devices were produced and deployed. 
The Einstein-Russell manifesto of 1955, for instance, 
called on scientists to become involved in public 
affairs in order to educate the public about the dan-
gers of nuclear warfare (12). 
11   Paul Weidling, ‘The Origins of Informed Consent: The International Scientiﬁ c Commission Medical War Crimes, and the Nuremberg Code,’ Bulletin of the History of Medicine, vol. 75, 
no. 1 (2001), pp. 37-71.
12   See, e.g., Morton Grodzins and Eugene Rabinowitch, eds., The Atomic Age: Scientists in National and World Aﬀ airs; Articles from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
1945-1962 (New York: Basic Books, 1963).
13 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Miﬄ  in, 1962).
14 See, e.g., Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
15  Cliﬀ ord Grobstein, A Double Image of the Double Helix: The Recombinant DNA Debate (San Francisco: Freeman, 1979).
16 Gerald Holton and Robert S. and Morison, eds., Limits of Scientiﬁ c Inquiry, theme issue, Daedalus, vol. 107, no. 2 (Spring 1978).
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Governing innovation 
and its discontents
Any approach to governing science must seek 
a balance between the bottom-up, emergent, 
unpredictable nature of science and top-down 
needs for social management. In the past, the ser-
endipity of science has been used as an argument 
for governance of the products but not the proc-
esses of science. Following a linear model, from 
science, through technological development to 
social benefit, the assumption that science is 
autonomous and self-governing has been under-
stood to mean that the only point of governance 
for innovation more broadly is the marketplace or 
end-of-pipe regulation.
Yet ‘innovation policy’ – the shaping of science and 
innovation – does not need to be an oxymoron. As 
one policy critic has argued with regard to nanote-
chnology, funders and regulators are starting to 
realise that “we vastly underestimate our ability to 
productively shape the scientific enterprise (20).” 
Recent activities in the United States and Europe 
centred on nanotechnology have increasingly con-
sidered the whys and how’s of shaping innovation 
for greater public good. The reality is that innovation 
is far from linear. Basic research is now driven as 
much by imagined technological applications as by 
scientific curiosity and innovation typically takes 
place in a web of interactions among scientists, 
engineers, governments, private corporations, finan-
cial investors, users, and others. To complement 
downstream regulation, proposals have been devel-
oped for various forms of upstream engagement 
prospects of biodiversity destruction and volition-
al evolution, argued the need for ‘science and 
technology [to be] tempered by ethics and poli-
tics’ (17). Leon Kass expressed an even more 
provocative criticism by defending the ‘wisdom of 
repugnance’ (18) and producing a President’s Coun-
cil on Bio ethics report that criticized programs for 
use of drugs, bioengineering, and genetics for 
human enhancement in performance and life 
extension (19). Such issues continue to reverberate 
in debates about the possibilities of post- or trans-
human futures. At the same time, demands for the 
application of science and technological innova-
tion in human affairs have only increased in the 
fields of medicine, agriculture, communications 
media, transport, and weapons development. The 
socio-cultural momentum of science and innova-
tion is a global pheno menon.
The outcome of this hundred-year history of sci-
ence-society interactions is that in the first decade 
of the 21st century scientific knowledge is increas-
ingly characterised by ambi valence – loved as well 
as feared, presenting both opportunities and 
uncertainties. The social contract for science is 
open to renegotiation. Such ambivalence can only 
be met with intelligent governance both to realise 
positive potentials and to mitigate unintended 
consequences. As science globalises, and global 
problems – climate change, economic inequalities, 
planet-scale insecurity – look insoluble without 
appropriate scientific innovation and transnational 
cooperation, debates about the governance of 
science necessarily take on their own global 
character.
17  Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 303.
18  Leon Kass, ‘The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We Should Ban the Cloning of Humans,’ New Republic, vol 216, no. 22 (2 June 1997), pp. 17-26.
19   President’s Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness (New York: HarperCollins, 2003).
20 David H. Guston, ‘Innovation Policy – Not Just a Jumbo Shrimp,’ Nature, vol. 454 (21 August 2008), pp. 940-941.
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promote the economic and societal benefits of 
science, its social context has become increasing-
ly important and arguments against multi-level 
global governance less defensible.
As more and more societies move towards greater 
dependence on science and therefore devote 
increased public and private funds to its support, 
science in its own many aspects and internationally 
has naturally become subject to increased public 
scrutiny. One form of such scrutiny has been efforts 
to adapt New Public Management (NPM) processes 
that promote governance in terms of well-defined 
results, transparency, ‘value for money’ and a growing 
role for competition in funding. NPM approaches 
call for more use of internal and external evaluations 
and impact assessments as well as the establish-
ment of monitoring systems in science focused 
on efficient use of resources, deliverable outcomes, 
and achieved social and economic benefits.
As economics, politics, and science become more 
intertwined, competitions for science funding and 
public interest take on a language of expecta-
tions (26). Corporations, governments, and scientists 
themselves combine to raise expectations about 
particular areas of science, as has been illustrated 
in the cases of genetically modi fied (GM) organisms 
and nano technology. In both cases, grand claims 
for environmental or poverty-alleviating benefits 
were initially overstated. Deploying the weight of 
authority, scientists simply called on the state to 
that would expose assumptions hidden in practices 
and identify where innovation might be amenable 
to governance. These include constructive technol-
ogy assessment (CTA), citizen consensus conferences, 
real-time technology assessment (RTTA) and various 
other methods (21). Another proposal has focused 
on ‘midstream modulation’ that could take place 
in research and development laboratories to help 
sensitize knowledge and innovation workers about 
the multiple implications of their work (22). Such 
approaches have met with modest acceptance in 
the public sector. But the challenges of setting goals 
for and managing scientific research and techno-
logical innovation are exacerbated in corporate and 
military contexts, where competitive pressures tend 
to reduce opportunities for measured reflection and 
public discussion (23).
In 2007 a previous expert group on science and 
governance resented to the European Commission 
a report, Taking European Knowledge Society Seri-
ously, arguing a need to identify new approaches 
to the democratic governance of innovation. Public 
debates are appropriate not just with regard to the 
impacts of applied science and technology, but 
also about scientific processes and the trajectories 
of innovation (24). According to this previous analy-
sis, there is need for an expansion from risk 
governance to innovation governance (25). Our 
analysis points towards the complementary exten-
sion of such governance to global levels. Indeed, 
as governments in many countries progressively 
21  Ari Rip, Thomas Misa and Johann Schot, eds., Managing Technology in Society: The Approach of Constructive Technology Assessment (London: Thomson, 1995); 
David H. Guston and Daniel Sarewitz, ‘Real-Time Technology Assessment,’ Technology in Society, vol. 24 no 1 (2002), pp. 93-109; James Wilsdon, Brian Wynne and Jack Stilgoe, 
The Public Value of Science (London: Demos, 2005).
22  Erik Fisher, Roop L. Mahajan, and Carl Mitcham, ‘Midstream Modulation of Technology: Governance from Within,’ Bulletin of Science, Technology, and Society, 
vol. 26, no. 6 (2006), pp. 485-496.
23 For a contrasting assessment, see Steven Shapin, The Scientiﬁ c Life: A Moral History of a Late Modern Vocation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).
24   Ulrike Felt, Brian Wynne, et al, Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously, Report of the Expert Group on Science and Governance, to the Science, 
Economy and Society Directorate, Directorate-General for Research, European Commission, 2007.
25  See also Brian Wynne, ‘Public Participation in Science and Technology: Performing and Obscuring a Political-Conceptual Category Mistake,’ East Asian Science, 
Technology and Society: An International Journal, vol. 1 (2007), pp. 99-110.
26   Nike Brown and Michael Michael, ‘A Sociology of Expectations: Retrospecting Prospects and Prospecting Retrospects,’ Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, 
vol.15, no 1 (2003), pp. 3-18.
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of the scientific community justifiably worry that the 
growth of mandated science unduly politicises their 
own activities and limits autonomy. Mandated 
science is not in itself a problem, but reveals to 
members of the scientific community the political 
contexts of their work, which can be daunting. 
Scientists do not have to be passive players in man-
dated science (32). The challenge across all levels of 
governance is to establish new forms of dialogue 
that open up the science-policy relationship (33).  
The call for greater accountability and openness is 
challenging for many scientific systems. Peer 
review, for instance, is a keystone of scientific qual-
ity assurance, but sometimes functions as well as 
an ‘old boy’ or ‘in-group’ network that can discrim-
inate against younger researchers, women and 
minorities. Additionally, investments in science 
compete with other public goods, especially since 
it is not always clear how arguments by scientists 
for greater public funding should be evaluated in 
relation to other special interest groups. As one 
leading critic has pointed out, “where there is pow-
er there will be abuse of it; where there are rewards 
there will be corruption” – something just as true 
in science as anywhere else (34). Autonomy and self-
governance can lead to the promotion of narrow 
self-interests beneath grand promises, favouring 
inertia and established orthodoxies over the devel-
opment of new disciplines and groups in pursuit 
of uncertain but promising research.
serve a supporting role. As one study of the Euro-
pean biotechnology controversy in the 1990s 
argued, “the state’s role was perceived to be restrict-
ed to providing a congenial environment for 
industrial performance, and it was no longer con-
sidered appropriate for the state to promote other 
social goals when regulating biotechnology (27).” 
At the global level, hype surrounding emerging 
technologies in rich countries tends to narrow 
options in the developing world, where countries 
find themselves having to import both technolog-
ical promises and governance frameworks. South 
Africa and Kenya hastily joined the group of coun-
tries supporting GM crops before considering 
appropriate legal and policy frameworks, investing 
in GM infrastructure before policy and legal regimes 
could be erected to deal with the implications of 
the technology (28).
The issue of how science is used to inform, support, 
justify or challenge political decision making has 
thus become problematic. One scholar introduced 
the term ‘mandated science’ (29) to describe ‘the 
body of science or technology – includingbasic sci-
ence and applied research – drawn on expressly for 
the purpose of public policy and regulation’ (30). 
Others have talked about ‘policy-relevant science’ 
or ‘trans-science (31)’. Science, especially in areas of 
strategic importance such as energy and security, 
is often at the heart of political debates. Members 
27  Elisabeth Bongert, ‘Towards a ‘European Bio-Society? Zur Europäisierung der neuen Biotechnologie,’ in Renate Martinsen, ed., Politik und Biotechnologie. 
Die Zumutung der Zukunft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997), pp.117-134.
28  Pamela Andanda, ‘Developing Legal Regulatory Frameworks for Modern Biotechnology: The Possibilities and Limits in the Case of GMOs’, 
African Journal of Biotechnology, vol. 5, no. 15 (2006), pp. 1360-1369.
29 Liora Salter with Edwin Levy and William Leiss, Mandated Science:  Science and Scientists in the Making of Standards (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988).
30  Liora Salter, ‘Mechanisms and Practices for the Assessments of the Social and Cultural Implications of Science and Technology,’ Occasional Papers, no. 8 (July 1995). 
See http://www.ic.gc.ca/epic/sites/eas-aes.nsf/print-en/ra00006e.html. (Accessed 25 July 2008).
31  Sheila Jasanoﬀ , The Fifth Branch:Science Advisers as Policymakers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); and Alvin Weinberg, Nuclear Reactions: 
Science and Trans-Science (New York: American Institute of Physics, 1992).
32 John B. Robinson, ‘Risks, Predictions and Other Optical Illusions: Rethinking the Use of Science in Social Decision-Making,’ Policy Sciences, vol. 25, no. 3 (1993), pp. 237-254.
33   Robert Frodeman and Carl Mitcham, eds., ‘Toward a Philosophy of Science Policy,’ Philosophy Today, vol. 48, no. 5 (supplement, 2004); Alan Irwin, Kevin Jones, and Jack Stilgoe, 
The Received Wisdom: Opening Up Expert Advice (London: Demos, 2006); and Roger Pielke, Jr., The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007).
34 Ian C. Jarvie, ‘Science in a Democratic Republic,’ Philosophy of Science, vol.68 (2001), pp.545-564.
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To make the same point in different words: 
As science becomes more ubiquitous, it becomes 
a victim of its own success, placed under greater 
external pressure to reflect consciously on its polit-
ical, economic, and cultural contexts. As countries 
and regions set their sights on becoming ‘know-
ledge economies’ and mandated science is target-
ed at particular objectives, there emerge new 
forms of ‘techno-nationalism.’ By contrast, scien-
tists tend to look across national borders, creating 
a tension between science and national political 
economies. Yet links between scientists and mech-
anisms of global governance are typically much 
weaker than those with national governments. 
Where international organisations have the poten-
tial to govern globally, they do not have the weight, 
in terms of funding, steering and the use of science 
to complement their policies. The global govern-
ance of science thus calls for new global relations 
between what might be called the society of 
science and the larger society in which science 
exists, treating each as active participants in new 
relationships.
Conclusion: Towards 
constructive governance
All of this signals the end of an age in which science 
and technology served as uncontested symbols of 
secular progress and enjoyed enormous freedom 
and autonomy. Science itself, like other social insti-
tutions, has its own politics. Social relations between 
scientific communities, scientists as experts, society 
and the public have changed. The appearance of 
politics in science may be read as further exemplify-
ing Adolph Lowe’s astute insight that social 
experience has fundamentally changed from a state 
in which things simply ‘happened’ to a world in 
which more and more they are ‘made’ to happen (35). 
Paradoxically, this transformation owes its origins as 
well to the increased presence of scientific knowl-
edge in both the private and public realms. Science 
is what enables people to make things happen. It is 
a capacity to act that pushes back the boundaries 
of what once appeared to be beyond human ability 
to change, alter, or manage. The result is that new 
knowledge and new technical abilities come to be 
experienced not just as benefits but also as risks to 
health and for some even as threats to the human 
condition itself (36). In such circumstances, science as 
the capacity to act must be directed towards science 
itself in the effort to generate a science of science 
and innovation polities in order to produce new 
mechanisms of social management and control.
35 Adolph Lowe, ‘Is Present-day Higher Learning ‘Relevant’?,’ Social Research, vol. 38 (1971), pp.563-580.
36  See, e.g., the argument of Juergen Habermas in Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur: Auf dem Weg zu einer liberalen Eugenik? (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001).
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arity open up the space for vital debates about 
what counts as good science in a broad social con-
text. In significant ways, the scientific community 
can benefit from enlarging its own understandings 
of what counts as good science.
Governing serendipity
Autonomy has traditionally been seen as a major 
characteristic and crucial precondition for scientific 
progress. Although sociologists were among the 
first to analyze this aspect of science, perhaps the 
strongest defence is that articulated by physical 
chemist Michael Polanyi in a reflection on what he 
called ‘The Republic of Science’ (37). According to 
Polanyi, “The Republic of Science is a Society of 
Explorers” in which scientists, “freely making their 
own choice of problems and pursuing them in the 
light of their own personal judgement,” are working 
under self-co-ordination of independent initiatives 
“guided as by ‘an invisible hand’ towards the joint 
discovery of a hidden system of things.” Polanyi 
claimed that any attempts by external authorities 
to interfere in the co-ordination of science posed 
a threat to scientific progress. For him, “the aspira-
tion of guiding progress of science into socially 
beneficent channels” was an impossible and non-
sensical aim. Polanyi concluded that, when it comes 
to governance, “You can kill or mutilate the advance 
of science, you cannot shape it.”
By contrast, the crystallographer J.D. Bernal, in an 
analysis of the ‘Social Function of Science’ (38), 
argued that preference should be given to the 
applied sciences over basic, curiosity-driven 
research – and that there is no moral boundary 
between the production of knowledge and its 
application. For Bernal, science is an instrument for 
Chapter 2.
The Society 
of Science
The governance of science takes place on multiple 
levels. Science is an expert activity dependent on 
interactions among specialists. Self-governance 
within such a social institution is not always based 
on a full appreciation of its broader contexts and 
implications. Nevertheless, any effort directed 
towards a global governance of science in all its 
contemporary complexity requires making a serious 
attempt to understand, engage with, and encour-
age governance systems within science. Formally 
and informally, science has its own practices, proce-
dures and cultures that aim to ensure quality and 
progress. They also provide a governance framework 
that has to some degree adapted to the wider con-
texts in which science is now situated.
This chapter thus begins by considering some of 
the ways the society of science governs itself along 
with possible weaknesses of such practices. Included 
are discussion of scientific integrity and research 
ethics, paying special attention to how scientists 
deal with ‘bad science’ and misconduct  – often 
defined as fabrication, falsification and plagiarism 
(FFP). It then describes how the concept of bad 
science has shifted in recent years to encompass 
what have been called ‘questionable research 
practices.’ Finally, it looks at how fostering and 
affirming ‘good science’ can involve more than 
simply guarding against bad science. Aspects of 
critical science and a trend towards interdisciplin-
37 Michael Polanyi, ‘The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory,’ Minerva, vol.1 (1962), pp.54-74.
38 J.D. Bernal, The Social Function of Science (New York: Macmillan, 1939).
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control can be abused by specific political or soci-
etal interests. Historical instances of such abuse 
range from religious opposition to new scientific 
discoveries centuries ago to Nazi and Communist 
ideologically driven distortions of research pro-
grammes. Some politically-driven research pro-
grammes such as the Manhattan project or the 
Apollo programme may have been technically suc-
cessful even while producing results that could be 
contested as social goods. Approaches to global 
governance, therefore, need to ask not only how 
science does, can and should govern itself but the 
limits of such self governance.
A spectrum of misconduct
Scientific misconduct has been a repeated concern 
in the society of science. In 1830, the English math-
ematician Charles Babbage identified three 
malpractices in science: ‘cooking’, ‘forging’ and 
‘trimming’ of data. Some science journalists have 
argued that the history of science is littered with 
multiple types of misconduct and that these remain 
common in current practice (40). Partly in response 
to such charges, after considerable debate, the U.S. 
Office of Science and Technology Policy proposed 
to limit scientific misconduct to “fabrication, falsi-
fication, or plagiarism in proposing, performing, 
or reviewing research, or in reporting research 
results (41).” Federal funding agencies in the U.S. 
now require recipient institutions to establish clear 
policies for dealing with FFP allegations. In Europe, 
which does not yet have as widely instituted a def-
inition or established policies, discussion has 
sometimes focused on the more general ‘ques-
tionable research practices’ (QRP), which covers 
such issues as misuse of statistics and duplicate 
social transformation and emancipation, and 
should be rooted in practical life. From this per-
spective, which is also that of the pragmatist John 
Dewey, (39) science should be judged by its utility 
broadly construed, scientific freedom is legiti-
mately limited by governmental research policy 
and disinterestedness should be replaced by 
a comprehensive ethical obligation towards the 
production and application of knowledge benefi-
cial to society. Although Bernal’s position is implicit 
in much contemporary science policy criticism, the 
understanding of social benefit has too often been 
narrowed to economic benefit.
While it remains questionable whether ‘The 
Republic of Science’ has ever been as autonomous 
or self-governing as claimed by Polanyi, there is 
now widespread recognition of need to control, to 
steer and to govern the development of science. 
There are also questions about the limits and 
potential abuses of the self-governance of science. 
The individual actions of autonomous individuals 
may not scale up to the collective good. Polanyi’s 
‘invisible hand’ may be invisible simply because it 
does not exist. Calls for the social control and steer-
ing of science have further intensified due to the 
risks associated with new advances, as in contro-
versies surrounding environmental pollution, 
computer and information privacy, GM foods, clon-
ing, and stem cells research. Such controversies 
have led to qualifications of scientific authority and 
increased demands for public participation in the 
governance of science.
That said, top-down social control and steering of 
science remains problematic. Just as the self-gov-
ernance of science can be abused by narrow self-
interests of some scientists, political and social 
39  See, e.g., John Dewey, ‘The Supreme Intellectual Obligation’, Science, vol. 79 (16 March 1934), pp. 240-243.
40 William Broad and Nicholas Wade, Betrayers of the Truth: Fraud and Deceit in the Halls of Science (New York: Simon and. Schuster, 1982).
41 U.S. Federal Register, vol. 65, no. 235: pp. 76260-76264 (December 2000).
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New York Times had already concluded that “as 
research around the globe has increased, most 
without the benefit of [peer review] safeguards, 
so have the cases of scientific misconduct (44).” 
Not even peer review journal editors seemed able 
to exercise effective quality control (45). 
The soul-searching that accompanies cases of fraud 
and misconduct tends to produce a variety of apol-
ogies. Fraudulent scientists have been portrayed 
as ‘bad apples’ who lack the shared morals of the 
rest of the scientific community or are simply una-
ware of the rules. Alternatively, it has been argued 
that the problem is increased pressures on indi-
vidual scientists to accelerate research and 
reputation, to ‘publish or perish’ and secure scarce 
funds. Yet Hwang was no outlier scientist; he was 
one of Korea’s – and the worlds – top stem cell 
researchers. He must have understood the rules 
concerning FFP, even as he sought to serve as a 
model for emerging Korean bioscience. Whatever 
the explanation, fraud and misconduct present 
serious challenges to science, since their existence 
suggests at least some inadequacies in the way 
scientific practice is itself organised.
Discussions of scientific fraud and misconduct tend 
to present science as black and white. Closer inspec-
tion reveals that scientific quality and integrity exists 
in various shades of grey. As a result, the society of 
science has witnessed increasing attention not just 
to FFP but also to QRP. Scientific researchers can 
engage in practices that raise ethical concerns 
without counting as FFP. Failures by co-authors, 
peer reviewers, and scientific editors to detect FFP 
and the resistance of scientific journals to publiciz-
ing fully their mistakes are cases in point. Indeed, 
publication. The ideal is generally called ‘respon-
sible conduct of research’ (RCR). The result is 
a spectrum which, according to one analysis, 
looks something like this (42).
 like this (42). RCR ➔ QRP ➔ FFP
 Ideal behaviour ➔ Worst behaviour
The prevailing view within the society of science is 
that that FFP and QRP are limited to a minority of 
scientists and that the self-correcting nature of sci-
ence acts to expose, punish and make both 
relatively inconsequential. The prevalence of FFP 
has been estimated at 1-2 % among active scien-
tists, with preliminary empirical data setting QRP at 
5 % or above, often exceeding 10 % (43). Such statis-
tics suggest that, especially in the case of QRP, 
occurrence may be more consequential than com-
monly admitted.
In the 2000s, the issue of serious misconduct again 
became an issue of scientific and public discussion 
because of a number of new high-profile cases. In 
early 2002 doubt was raised, later substantiated, 
about Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory physicist 
Victor Ninov’s reported synthesis of element 118. 
Later that year nanotechnology research by Bell 
Labs physicist Jan Hendrik Schön was revealed to 
be riddled with false claims. Both cases led to career 
ending sanctions, and to questions as well regard-
ing the integrity of some collaborators and co-
authors. Then even more dramatically, in 2006 
South Korean biomedical scientist Hwang Woo-Suk 
was indicted on charges of embezzlement and the 
violation of bioethics laws involving human embry-
onic stem cell research. Late the previous year the 
42 Nicholas H. Steneck. ‘Fostering Integrity in Research: Deﬁ nitions, Current Knowledge, and Future Directions,’ Science and Engineering Ethics, vol. 12, no. 1 (2006), pp. 53-74.
43 Brian C. Martinso, Melissa S. Anderson, and Raymond de Vries, ‘Scientists Behaving Badly,’ Nature, vol. 435 (9 June 2005), pp. 737-738.
44 Lawrence K. Altman and William J. Broad, ‘Global Trend: More Science, More Fraud,’ New York Times, Tuesday, December 20, 2005, p. D1.
45  For more detail, see Lawrence K. Altman, ‘For Science’s Gatekeepers, a Credibility Gap,’ New York Times, Tuesday, May 2, 2006, D1.
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considered, tend to be taken on by scientific fund-
ing bodies in order to ensure their money is used 
appropriately. Yet here too there are large discrep-
ancies between countries and few mechanisms 
for seeking international engagement. Too often in 
the past, institutions have seen scientific integrity 
as a matter of ensuring compliance – eradicating 
the bad rather than positively fostering good 
practices. We are now starting to see, at an over-
arching level, a rekindling of interest in normative 
aspects of doing science.
One professional scientific effort to consider in 
modest depth the RCR ideal was a collaborative 
project of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, 
National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of 
Medicine along with the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science. These intermediate 
associations in the society of science have worked 
to explore ‘responsible science’ and developed 
guidelines for appropriate education in the respon-
sible conduct of research. Their report is a widely-used 
pamphlet that has been translated and published 
in a number of languages, including Chinese and 
Spanish (47). 
In the United Kingdom, a former chief scientific 
adviser to the government, recently published a 
‘universal ethical code for scientists.’ Talking about 
the need for ‘Rigour, Respect and Responsibility,’ 
it was argued that the code would “demonstrate 
to the public that scientists take ethical issues seri-
ously (48).” One critical assessment, however, sees 
the code as based on an assumption that public 
distrust is caused by scientific malpractice rather 
the same study from which prevailing percentage 
estimates are derived revealed that many scientists 
report having engaged in questionable practices 
themselves. Other QRPs include the biased presen-
tation of data, using unauthorised data and, 
pertinently for issues of global governance, con-
ducting research in countries or regions with lower 
ethical or regulatory standards for the sake of con-
venience.
Under the QRP umbrella debates have revealed a 
lack of clarity about norms and rules of authorship 
of scientific papers. Authorship is a vital part of sci-
entific systems of reward and recognition. Yet there 
are no firmly agreed upon global standards for 
authorship. Journal editors in the biomedical 
research are were the first to recognize the need for 
such standards. Thus evolved what now is known 
as the Vancouver Guidelines of authorship. A small 
group of journal editors published such 
a standard for the first time in 1979, and these have 
been revised several times by an enlarged group (46). 
But questions remain: Who should count as a prop-
er author of a scientific publication? What is the 
difference between first, last, and other authors? 
What responsibility should co-authors have for the 
content of a publication?
As part of the growing concern for quality, defini-
tions of what counts as bad science have evolved, 
although again there no strong global consensus 
within the society of science about the precise 
character of good science. Indeed, there seems 
only limited capacity for discussing the issue. 
Questions of scientific integrity, when explicitly 
46   See ‘Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Medical Journals: Writing and Editing for Biomedical Publication,’ 
updated October 2008, and available at http://www.icmje.org/
47  Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, On Being a Scientist: Responsible Conduct in Research, second edition (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995).  
A third edition is in preparation.
48   Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, Government Oﬃ  ce for Science, ‘Rigour, Respect and Responsibility: A Universal Ethical Code for Scientists’ (2007). 
(The author was Sir David King.)
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sustainability and climate change. Pressures to 
contribute to innovation and the global compet-
itiveness of nations may easily result in knowledge 
that emphasises potential benefits to certain 
groups and overlooks unintended risks. In most 
areas of research there is a striking discrepancy 
between the amount of research devoted to new 
and innovative technologies compared to that 
directed towards addressing potential threats to 
health, environment, or social welfare. This is not 
necessarily all wrong, since the latter type of 
research in many instances depends on the 
former. But it is still reasonable to fear that incen-
tives for research directed towards economic 
innovation could become so dominating as to 
crowd out other concerns.
The sciences that produce technological innova-
tion are in general ill equipped to consider complex 
risks, which demand inter-disciplinary attention. 
No single discipline can effectively screen complex 
risks on a pro-active basis. Yet our current system 
of knowledge production may have contributed 
to streamlining scientific disagreements to issues 
of mere technicalities. Within systems of scientific 
governance, the tendency is towards a concentra-
tion of scientific activity in areas that seem to be 
productive in an only limited sense of the term. 
Even interdisciplinarity is sometimes judged solely 
on its ability to advance a particular technical 
project. But there is need to encourage diversity of 
activity, which means reasserting the value of dif-
ferent strands of science and open debate about 
the value of these various strands. In the words of 
one sociologist of science, “debates within science 
than something more fundamental (49). Public 
unease about science is not concerned only with 
the issue of ‘means’; it is also related to the per-
ceived ‘ends’ of science, technology and innovation. 
Bottom-up efforts to rethink questions of scientific 
integrity therefore need to address the question of 
‘What is science for?’ as part of the question ‘What 
counts as good science?’ Over the last few decades, 
much of this more proactive discussion has taken 
place in regard to the issue of ‘critical science’.
Relevant science, critical 
science and interdisciplinarity
Even within the society of science it is increasingly 
recognized that science is tied to its uses and 
contexts (50). Large parts of science are now instru-
mentalised, either as tools for policymaking, or as 
fuels for technological change and economic 
growth (51). This asks scientists to engage with the 
context of their work, rather than assuming that it 
takes place in a social and -political void. The approach 
has led some scientists to ask significant questions 
about the uses to which their work is placed.
Questions have arisen about whether existing sci-
ence practices and policies, especially what has 
been termed the commodification of scientific 
knowledge, may bias knowledge production. As 
science finds itself under increasing pressure to 
deliver economic growth, the desires of the mar-
ket can be emphasised over the long-term 
common good, especially regarding global chal-
lenges such as poverty and equity, environmental 
49   Robert Doubleday, ‘Ethical Codes and Scientiﬁ c Norms: The Role of Communicating in Maintaining the Social Contract for Science,’ in Richard Holliman, Jeﬀ  Thomas, 
Sam Smidt, Eileen Scanlon and Elizabeth Whitelegg, eds., Practicing Science Communication in the Information Age: Theorizing Professional Practices (New York: Oxford University 
Press, forthcoming).
50  This move is sometimes characterized as a shift from Mode 1 to Mode 2 knowledge production. See Michael Gibbons, Camille Limoges, Helga Nowotny, Simon Schwartzman, 
Peter Scott, and Martin Trow, The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies (London: Sage, 1994).
51  James Wilsdon, Brian Wynne and Jack Stilgoe, The Public Value of Science (London: Demos, 2005).
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obvious need for inter- and multi-disciplinary col-
laboration. Solutions to these challenges will likely 
come from combinations of sciences, engineering, 
social sciences, the humanities, the arts, politics and 
economics. For present purposes, another signifi-
cant feature of interdisciplinarity is that it encour-
ages researchers to rethink the assumptions of their 
own disciplines as part of an engagement with oth-
ers. Open-minded cooperation between the phys-
ical and biological sciences, the social sciences and 
the humanities has the potential to deepen the 
quality and relevance of research. Experiences from 
ethics councils and other forms of dialogue around 
science are that collaboration between disciplines 
fosters important broader understandings, which 
are of benefit to both scientists and the general 
public. Interdisciplinarity will continue to be exper-
imental, but this should be seen as an opportunity 
rather than a threat. Cooperation provides oppor-
tunities for the creation of new models of research 
and governance from the bottom up.
Worthy of special attention in this regard are dedi-
cated efforts to involve scholars from the social 
sciences and the humanities, especially philosophy 
and ethics, in research projects. In the United States, 
for instance, the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implica-
tions (ELSI) program associated most notably with 
the human genome project, has made a serious 
effort to stimulate critical interdisciplinary reflection 
especially regarding the good of science. Although 
not always as successful as some might have 
wanted, the ELSI approach is nevertheless and 
important effort (55). 
are simultaneously debates about science and how 
it should be done – or who should be doing it (52)”. 
It is the job of critical science to air these debates, 
encourage them and encourage diverse science.
As a key part of civil society itself, the society of sci-
ence has often served a vital critical function, 
contributing to the questioning of orthodoxy, par-
ticularly in the environmental sphere. This function 
deserves to be maintained and fostered, especially 
within the society of science for the good of soci-
ety at large. Scientists are by and large willing to 
engage in such debates, but are often constrained 
by science policies that act to narrow their perspec-
tives (53). The globalisation of science suggests the 
need for more global criticism, in order to avoid 
a merely technical or specialized globalisation.
The idea of interdisciplinarity has the capacity to 
open space for the re-imagination of the ends as 
well as the means of science. The European Union 
Research Advisory Board has recommended sup-
port for increased interdisciplinarity in research and 
education. In the United States as well the National 
Academy of Sciences issued a report on ‘Facilitating 
Interdisciplinary Research.’ Interdisciplinarity is an 
attractive policy idea, because it promises a new 
source of innovation. But the value of interdiscipli-
narity is broader than this (54). 
The global governance of science involves crossing 
boundaries – between countries and between dis-
ciplines. A number of the global challenges faced 
today – energy, environment, welfare, social justice, 
public health, security and more – suggest an 
52  Seven Epstein, Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
53  Dan Agin, Junk Science: How Politicians, Corporations, and Other Hucksters Betray Us (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006).
54   Studies of interdisciplinarity can be found in , for example, Julie Thompson Klein, Interidsicplinarity: History, Theory, and Practice (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1990); 
Peter Weingart and Nico Stehr, eds., Practicing Interdisciplinarity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn et al., eds., Handbook of Transdisciplinary 
Research (Springer, 2008); Thinking Across Disciplines: Interdisciplinarity in Research and Education (Forum for Business Education and Danish Business Research Academy, 
2008); and Robert Frodeman et al., eds, Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
55   Erik Fisher, ‘Lessons Learned from the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI) Program: Planning Societal Implications Research for the National Nanotechnology 
Program,’ Technology in Society, vol. 27 (2005), pp. 321-328.
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The disclosure enables others to build on the achieved 
knowledge. In Europe there is a traditional academic 
exemption, mentioned in most national laws, which 
allows further research without payment to the 
inventor, if the research is not commercial. In the Unit-
ed Sates, legislation does not provide such an aca-
demic exemption, but in practise there are often 
agreements between patent owners and research 
laboratories, although it is not a right. A number of 
international instruments exist, such as the Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (TRIPS) and World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) that bear on such issues.
The tendency for researchers to be more aware of 
and more obliged to look for patenting possibilities 
may infringe the tradition of knowledge sharing. 
This may present obstacles to further research 
and global collaboration on research projects. As 
revealed by discussions concerning the patenting 
genetic research findings, there is currently insuf-
ficient exchange between science and the law. 
Where discussion does take place, it tends to be 
procedural, paying little attention to ethical issues 
related to the public good.
The patent system may also be problematic for 
developing countries, science exclusive rights may 
hinder fair exploitation and use in a number of ways. 
In some cases IPR regimes contribute to widening 
divides in knowledge and research between devel-
oped and developing countries. UNESCO has taken 
up the topic of IPR in a global context, but there is 
lack of information regarding the consequences of 
IPR – especially the extent to which it enables or 
disables further research and innovation. Such 
divides may be exacerbated by a lack of access to 
published scientific research, suggesting another 
rationale for open access to publications (56). 
Open science and open access
From its eighteenth century origins, the society of 
science has made claims to openness. Science, 
unlike politics or religion, claims to engage with the 
physical world, to discover the way it really is. It also 
aspires to be open to membership without class, 
national, religious, ethnic, or sexual prejudice to 
anyone able to undergo the appropriate initiating 
apprenticeship. Science has, of course, often failed 
to live up to its ideals. It can dogmatically function 
as an ideology that excludes some forms of knowl-
edge. And economic networks and cultural 
prejudices have limited participation in science 
among underprivileged groups. Yet the ideal of 
openness remains a dynamic force that has influ-
enced the historical development of the society of 
science and continues to be manifest in such diverse 
forms as the ‘open society’ of Karl Popper and the 
open software of computer scientists. The concept 
of open access to scientific knowledge is but anoth-
er peculiarly salient manifestation of a perennial 
scientific ideal within the scientific community.
The concept of open access focuses reflection on 
the issue of who controls access to scientific knowl-
edge and by what means. Much of the debate 
takes place around the question of online access 
to scientific publication in an era of ubiquitous 
information. But of special concern is control of this 
access by legal means that assert some kind of 
property rights over scientific information, normally 
referred to as intellectual property rights (IPRs).
Patent law aims to promote innovation and the 
rapid dissemination of its associated knowledge. 
The inventor gets exclusive rights to control com-
mercial exploitation of inventions for some years 
and in return discloses detailed description of the 
invention, opening up the new knowledge to all. 
56  Open Access, Opportunities and Challenges, European Commission, 2008, 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document_library/pdf_06/open-access-handbook_en.pdf
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support from the larger society. But the discussions 
of FFP, QRP, and RCR also opens up a space for 
a broader and more substantive consideration of 
what counts as good or valuable science. Under 
pressure from national governments and private 
corporations to deliver economic growth, science 
has been asked to redefine its own sense of integ-
rity and to become self-critical of its social contexts. 
This is a valuable exercise, nevertheless limited by 
national borders and a tendency to remain within 
narrow bounds.
Attempts to launch debates over further directions 
of research and its socio-economic implications at 
global level thus remain fragmented. Some efforts 
have been made by international organisations 
(such as the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, World Bank, and United 
Nations) as well as international associations of 
scientists (such as the International Council of 
Scientific Unions, regional associations of national 
academies of sciences, and the World Academy of 
Young Scientists). These discussions are neverthe-
less largely restricted to small groups of scientists 
and experts. Some non-governmental activist 
organizations (such as Greenpeace) and movements 
(such as those in favour or nuclear disarmament 
or organic farming) have also made contributions 
to the discussion. But a system of global govern-
ance still needs better linkage of debates taking 
place within science to those taking place around 
science, in the larger civil society and policy spheres 
– that is, to science in society.
The call for open access and for greater openness 
in research has been led by scientists and scientific 
organisations, but has also met with institutions and 
systems of science that act to resist change. Debates 
about openness in scientific research and science 
communication illuminate broader concerns about 
science’s place in society and its own responsibilities 
in rethinking its practice and culture.
Conclusion: 
Rethinking good science
Given the unpredictable dimension of scientific dis-
covery, efforts to closely control scientific progress 
will no doubt fail. This is the basic insight that ani-
mates the society of science and its defence of self-
governance. But given the power of the society of 
science to influence human affairs in general, the 
broader society has a vested interest in insuring 
sound governance within science and appropriate 
articulation of governance of the relationships 
between science and society. The search for appro-
priate global governance of science must neverthe-
less begin with appreciation of some of the features 
of governance internal to science, which has been 
the theme of this chapter. Indeed, the scientific 
community’s attempt to regulate itself through 
the eradication of fabrication, falsification, and 
plagiarism, to examine questionable research 
practices such as data manipulation and multiple 
publication, and to pursue the responsible conduct 
of research are to be commended and deserve 
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knowledge. Scientists became a new priesthood, 
privileged elite to whom the public deferred and 
from whom the public benefited (57). The period 
after the end of the Cold War witnessed significant 
change in the privileged position of science and in 
the understanding of the place of science within 
society. In the 1980s, policymakers and scientific 
organisations diagnosed a disconnect between sci-
entific expertise and public opinion. The public 
appeared to be losing trust in orthodox science 
and levels of scientific literacy appeared worryingly 
low. The suggested solution, in line with the 
received wisdom, was a programme of science 
communication, aiming to promote what was then 
called the ‘public understanding of science (58).’ 
Within a decade, however, new research and the 
international experience of scientific governance 
began to challenge this ‘deficit model’ of public 
understanding (59). The public was not simply lack-
ing a kind of knowledge that scientists should 
supply, nor was it appropriate to learn only from 
scientists. What was called local or indigenous 
knowledge (for example, of environmental con-
taminations) was revealed in some cases to be 
more accurate, or more relevant, than decontextu-
alised scientific knowledge. This more nuanced 
understanding led to attempts to actively engage 
European publics in processes of science and sci-
entific governance. Efforts were made to reconstruct 
parts of science and parts of society to interact in 
myriad ways at different levels.
Selective European governments thus attempted to 
develop mechanisms for greater public involvement 
and became leaders in efforts to open up the gov-
ernance of science through public participation. 
Initiatives as diverse as Denmark’s Consensus Confer-
ences, the United Kingdom’s Science wise pro-
Chapter 3. 
Science in Society
Science will always be, to some degree, self-gov-
erning. But the society of science sits in a social 
context that cannot be ignored. The global govern-
ance of science therefore needs to be concerned 
not only with all aspects of science as a common 
institution but also the relationships between 
science and society, especially as these are trans-
formed by a globalizing world. The rapidly-changing 
context of global science and the pressing need to 
address global issues point toward needs for new 
forms of dialogue, across the borders between dis-
ciplines (scientific and non-scientific) and countries 
(developed and developing).
Again, the challenge is to seek a balance between 
the often competing needs for self-governing 
autonomy and political or social management. This 
chapter begins by reviewing recent dynamics in 
science-society relations, before turning to some 
of the challenges that emerge through globalisa-
tion regarding both the means and ends of science, 
its practices of science and its aims. In both cases, 
however, there cannot help but be implicit referenc-
es back to internal aspects of the society of science.
From communication 
to deliberation
In Europe and North America the post-Enlighten-
ment history of cultural commitment to science 
held scientists as the custodians of authoritative 
57 Ralph Lapp, The New Priesthood: The Scientiﬁ c Elite and the Uses of Power (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).
58  Royal Society, The Public Understanding of Science (London: 1985).
59 Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne, eds, Misunderstanding Science? The public reconstruction of science and technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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a crisis of governance, and a new approach to the 
governance of science is needed (62).” The loss of def-
erence to expertise reinforces the need to construct 
new models of governance for a more sceptical age. 
Finding ways to involve the public and other stake-
holders across a spectrum of activities – including 
the assessment and management of risks, uncer-
tainties, ethics and the funding of research – is key 
to the construction of successful governance. Con-
nections with the public should no longer be 
viewed as exercises in better communications from 
a privileged elite. Policymakers increasingly recog-
nise that deliberation is a cornerstone of good 
governance. What global deliberative governance 
might look like nevertheless remains unclear.
One analysis of how different European countries 
are responding to the call for deliberative govern-
ance revealed a huge divergence in approaches (63). 
As most European countries have moved in the 
general direction of democracy, local distinctions 
have been accentuated. Across all countries studied 
– Denmark, Finland, Greece, Norway, Sweden, The 
Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom – 
governance was revealed in all cases to involve 
multiple actors beyond science and government 
(local, national and transnational). But following 
well-publicised controversies over GM crops and 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), different 
European countries adopted different governance 
strategies to manage both technologies and stake-
holder concerns. Across the world, we can expect 
such divergences to be magnified. Countries 
outside Europe will have different governance 
approaches and science in each country or culture 
gramme and the EU-wide Meeting of Minds citizens’ 
deliberation on brain science have experimented 
with the idea of citizen participation in science and 
science policy formation (60). Such activities brought 
together scientific experts with members of the 
public, other stakeholders and non-science leaders. 
Some of these experiments took place ‘upstream,’ 
engaging with early-stage discussions of research 
priorities and innovation trajectories. Others focused 
on opening up ‘downstream’ issues of science-based 
regulation. Yet it is fair to say that development in 
this area remains embryonic.
Where public dialogue has taken place, it has 
tended to question assumptions about aspects of 
issues that were previously considered scientific. 
Dialogue can help demonstrate that forms of 
external governance once considered neutral or 
unbiased, including regulatory systems and funding 
regimes, regularly involve far more than a simple 
use of good science for the implementation of 
public policy. Instead, the science used is often also 
a vehicle for introducing (while obscuring) norma-
tive decisions that deserve to be debated on their 
merits. The take-up and success of these delibera-
tive experiments has nevertheless been patchy. 
One clear lesson learned from experience so far is 
that such initiatives need to connect better to real 
governance decisions.
Public dialogue and opinion polling reveal that the 
often-cited ‘crisis’ of public trust in science may be 
more perceived than real (61). Behind the perception 
sits a more important concern. According to one 
recent analysis, “the crisis of trust in science is, in fact, 
60  See, e.g., Lars Klüver, ‘Consensus Conferences in the Danish Board of Technology,’ in Simon Joss and John Durant, eds., Public Participation in Science: The Role of Consensus 
Conferences in Europe (London: Science Museum, 1995), pp. 41-49.
61   See, for example, Sir Robert Worcester, ‘Public Attitudes to Science: What Do We Know?,’ in Engaging Science: Thoughts, Deeds and Action 
(London: Welcome Trust, 2006), pp. 14-19.
62   Keith G. Davies and Jonathan Wolf-Phillips, ‘Scientiﬁ c Citizenship and Good Governance: Implications for Biotechnology,’ Trends in Biotechnology, vol. 24, no.2 (February 2006), 
pp. 57-61.
63  Rob Hagendijk and Alan Irwin, ‘Public Deliberation and Governance: Engaging with Science and Technology in Contemporary Europe,’ 
Minerva, vo. 44, no. 2 (June 2006), pp. 167-184.
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Such ethics councils have undertaken to identify 
moral challenges, initiate ethical reflection and 
advise authorities, including national parliaments 
and governments. They have focused primarily on 
medical ethics, but other kinds of dilemmas, includ-
ing agriculture and animals, have also been on 
selected agendas. The recommendations some-
times lead to governance tools, including formal 
regulation on, for example, assisted reproduction, 
cloning, stem cell research, and privacy.
Outside Europe, in the United States and Canada 
national commissions have been complimented by 
the creation of what are called institutional review 
boards (IRBs) at research institutions and healthcare 
facilities to assess the moral acceptability of research 
protocols and experimental therapeutic treat-
ments. IRBs, unlike national commissions, are 
required to include community or public represen-
tation. Beyond the Americas, many African countries 
also use ethics review committees attached to insti-
tutions as instruments for ethical governance. Plans 
are also underway to establish a National Health 
Research Ethics Council in South Africa to oversee 
health research. In many cases, however, countries 
rely on their constitutions and statutory or com-
mon law for research governance and regulatory 
purposes (64).
National ethics councils are typically independent 
and interdisciplinary, but their variation between 
countries indicates something about the uncer-
tainties of democratic governance. Some include 
a wide range of stakeholders – scientists, lawyers, 
philosophers, psychologists, religious leaders, 
journalists and lay members – while others have 
a much narrower composition. Some include poli-
ticians and policymakers, who may otherwise be 
unwilling to engage in awkward or risky upstream 
will fit into different contexts. As science globalises, 
and the need for global governance looms larger, 
we therefore need to consider some of the myriad 
contexts of global science within global society.
Ethical governance
As noted in the previous chapter, the scientific 
community has since the 1980s addressed ques-
tions of ethical governance from the inside. At the 
same time, from the outside, new scientific discov-
eries and emerging technologies have also 
increased public ethical concerns. Ethics has 
become an issue relevant to the place of science in 
society in conjunction with assisted reproductive 
technologies, embryonic stem cell research, GM 
foods, advanced surveillance technologies and 
nanotechnology – not to mention chemical, bio-
logical and nuclear weapons of mass destruction.
The move towards participation in science recog-
nises the limits of experts – a recognition that 
applies as well to alleged ‘ethics experts.’ In the dec-
ades since the birth of the first in vitro conceived 
child, many countries, especially in Europe, have 
established ethics councils – national bodies 
designed to deliberate and inform on issues raised 
by biomedical innovation. The United States, for 
instance, established a commission in 1978 to for-
mulate a definition of death that could accommodate 
such life-extending technologies as heart-lung 
machines. In 1982 the United Kingdom established 
a Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (commonly known as the Warnock 
Committee, after its chair, Dame Mary Warnock). In 
Europe, France was the first to establish a more gen-
eral purpose council in 1983, followed by Denmark 
(1989), Germany (2001), and The Netherlands (1999). 
64  C.J. Grant, M. Lewis, and A. Strode, ‘The Ethical-Legal Regulation of HIV Vaccine Research in Africa: A Study of the Regulation of Health Research in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda to Determine Their Capacity to Protect and Promote the Rights of Persons Participating in HIV Vaccine Research,’ a technical report (Pietermaritzburg: 
Ethics, Law and Human Rights Working Group, African AIDS Vaccine Programme, 2005).
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* However, with the prospective implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the charter will be part of the legal framework of the European Union.
has brought together national ethics councils in the 
Forum of National Ethics Councils. In 2000, a year 
before the white paper on European Governance 
enunciated its five principles of good governance 
– openness, participation, accountability, effective-
ness, and coherence – the European Parliament 
formally adopted the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union. Although the authority of the 
Charter is moral rather than legal, it emphasizes that 
the Union is founded on six basic values (*):
dignity – including a right to personal autonomy 
and prohibitions of eugenic practices, commercial-
isation of human body and its parts, and human 
reproductive cloning;
freedoms – including freedom of the arts and the 
sciences;
equality – meaning especially equality before the 
law of all persons;
solidarity – which involves a right to health care 
and environmental protection;
citizens’ rights – including a right to good admin-
istration; and
justice – understood especially as the rule a demo-
cratically oriented legal system.
The Charter aims to preserve these common values 
while respecting the diversity of the cultures and 
traditions of the peoples of Europe, as well as the 
national identities and structures of member states. 
In this way it formulates a consensus-based context 
for the governance of science in European society, 
but one that should be relevant to the global com-
munity as well.
discussions. Ethics councils often reflect a national 
political context. Some aim for consensus and 
direct impact on decision-makers while others 
present a more complex picture of uncertainties 
and available options.
A European consensus
Efforts have been made, however, to establish 
a transnational European consensus to provide 
a foundational context for the ethical for the 
practice of science. Associated activities and their 
results are, we think, particularly relevant to possi-
bilities for the governance of science in society in 
a global context.
In 1998, the European Union appointed an ethics 
council to advise the European Commission – the 
European Group on Ethics (EGE) in science and 
new technologies. This group is independent, 
pluralistic and interdisciplinary, with its 15 members 
appointed in a personal capacity. EGE has issued 
reports on a series of issues, including stem cell 
research, patenting of stem cells, biobanks, genet-
ic testing, clinical research in developing countries, 
nano medicine, information and computer tech-
nologies, cloned meat and agriculture. Ethical 
considerations are included in a number of EU 
directives, but there are differences in the nature of 
obligations. In healthcare, for example, legislation 
for products such as medicines and medical devic-
es in EU markets has led to a harmonised system 
for member states, while legislation on ‘good clin-
ical practice’ establishes only minimum provisions, 
to be supplemented by national rules.
As part of the process of working to harmonize 
ethics across member states, the European Union 
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is ‘necessary for the progress of knowledge’ while 
reiterating the principle of free and informed con-
sent. The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics 
and Human Rights, adopted in 2005, contains fur-
ther specific provisions on ethical issues related to 
medicine, life sciences and associated technologies 
and advocates several ethical principles, including 
human dignity, consent, autonomy and responsi-
bility, privacy, equity and justice, solidarity and 
benefit sharing – all of which echo or are echoed 
in various statements of the European consensus.
Ethics across borders 
These emerging governance structures respond to 
a need for the ethical oversight of science and inno-
vation in society. But their presence poses a challenge 
to governance at a global level. Although the Euro-
pean ethical consensus may be more or less 
accepted by many countries, its enactment varies 
widely. The UNESCO Declaration, too, allows for 
a variety of implementations even though the 
wording is universal. In practice, global declarations, 
attempting to harmonise ethical standards, often 
end up at the lowest common denominator. Even 
so, resulting values may be prioritized differently in 
different regions, cultures and traditions. There may 
be no such thing as a set of ‘European’ ethical 
values (65), but there are clearly tensions between 
European and some other approaches to ethics, 
such as those more typical of the United States. In 
the United States, for example, there is a tendency 
for autonomy to outweigh dignity in ethical deci-
sion making, whereas the opposite is the case in 
Europe. The challenge therefore is to encourage 
the harmonisation of ethical values as part of 
a long-term project of global reflection on ethics, 
while recognizing and learning from diverse ethical 
practices.
The Council of Europe has also helped set the 
agenda for science and ethics across Europe. The 
Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine adopted in 1997, and based on 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedom from 1950, is binding 
only for those member states that have signed and 
ratified it. But all European projects funded under 
the Framework Programmes are obligated to com-
ply with its principles. The aim of the convention is 
to protect individuals against exploitation arising 
out of treatment or research. The parties “shall pro-
tect the dignity and identity of all human beings 
and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, 
respect for their integrity and other rights and fun-
damental freedoms with regard to the application 
of biology and medicine.”
Finally, it is important to note that the European 
consensus is in full harmony with a number of glo-
bal statements, including the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1948, Article 27 of which states 
that “Everyone has the right freely… to share in 
scientific advancement and its benefits.” At the glo-
bal level, UNESCO has likewise established the 
International Bioethics Commission (IBC) and an 
Intergovernmental Bioethics Commission (IGBC) to 
bring together ethical deliberation from around the 
world. The UNESCO Declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights was adopted by the 
UNESCO General Conference in 1997 and subse-
quently endorsed by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1998. Along with other points, it states 
that the “human genome underlies the fundamen-
tal unity of all members of the human family as well 
as the recognition of their inherent dignity and 
diversity,” Moreover, the Declaration affirms that the 
benefits of advances in the technologies should be 
made available to all and that freedom of research 
65 Hermerén Göran, ‘European Values – and Others; Europe’s Shared Values: Towards an Ever Closer Union?,’ European Review, vol. 16, no 3 (2008), pp. 373-385.
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Virtuous moral agents are those who consider their 
duties towards others instead of making claims on 
other to recognize their rights. Moral education of 
scientists is thus likely to be thought more impor-
tant than the legal regulation of science.
Non-European cultures and 
informed consent 
The challenge of enacting science in different soci-
eties can be illustrated in more detail by considering 
the practice of free and informed consent, which 
is fundamental to much biomedical, psychological, 
and social science research with human partici-
pants as practiced in Europe and North America. 
In such research human subjects will sometimes 
be exposed to risks – physical risks or risks to their 
privacy or values – for the benefit of society as 
a whole. But such exposure is only legitimated by 
the free and informed consent of participants in 
accord with a principle that has become increas-
ingly central to bioethics (66). The enacting of 
informed consent is nevertheless complex, espe-
cially when efforts are made to transfer this principle 
with deep European historical and cultural roots to 
quite different socio-cultural contexts.
Just as Germany’s experience of science under the 
Nazis still shapes its approach to controversial bio-
medical science, so in many developing countries, 
there is a fear of ‘research’ or ‘experimentation’ 
using local populations that is often rooted in pain-
ful histories of exploitation. In addition, subjects 
who live within a world view in which qi, yin,  yang, 
and wuxing are more significant than molecules, 
bacteria, viruses and genes may find it difficult to 
understand information provided to them in the 
language of contemporary biomedical science. 
Reflection on the global ethical governance of sci-
ence cannot help but reveal further tensions 
between universal principles and local approaches. 
Especially is this likely to be the case in internation-
al research collaborations, which have increased 
between developed and developing countries. 
European and North American scientists and cor-
porations now often see countries such as China 
and India as attractive for science in general and 
biomedical research in particular. Research there is 
cost-effective, with a ready supply of patients, hos-
pitals, rich genetic resources and untapped markets. 
Yet even though leading scientists in many devel-
oping countries have been educated abroad, local 
Asian traditions, cultures and political situations 
may be sharply different. Differing perspectives on 
medicine, personhood, and ethics are potential 
sources of misunderstandings that can affect both 
formal governance frameworks and informal scien-
tific practises.
Consider an example from China. Traditional Chinese 
cosmology sees the world as composed of qi, yin, 
yang, and wuxing (five elements, such as metal, 
wood, water, fire and earth), not of molecules, atoms 
and genes. The Chinese concept of personhood is 
not as substantial as in Europe but relational. The 
Chinese person is always interconnected with 
others, with parents at birth, then with brothers and 
sisters, later with other relatives, friends, neighbours, 
co-workers and community members. In Confu-
cianism, which continues to be widely influential 
among the Chinese people as well as throughout 
other parts of Asia, the normative requirement for 
inter-personal relationships is ren – for others. It is 
this that defines the difference between people as 
moral agents and animals. In this world view tradi-
tional duty and virtue function as more important 
ethical concepts than utility or rational imperatives. 
66  Ruth R. Faden and Tom L. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). See also Pamela Andanda, ‘Informed Consent,’ 
Developing World Bioethics Journal, vol. 5, no. 1 (2005), pp. 14-29.
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of science can obscure differences in local context 
and interpretation. Regulation, while claiming to be 
based on nothing more than scientific evidence, 
can look very different in different countries (68). 
Similarly, the process of innovation can vary enor-
mously from social context to social context and 
thus to resist governance in a wide variety of ways. 
The challenge is to openly negotiate difference 
rather than retreat to assertions of universality.
The challenge 
of ‘ethics-free zones’
A major complication for our picture of collabo-
ration on questions of ethics and science, and 
a barrier to global dialogue efforts, is the existence 
of ‘ethics free zones.’ In such places ethical over-
sight may be severely limited or non-existent, and 
the ethical principles mentioned above not 
accepted or accepted but poorly implemented. 
As globalisation makes the transfer of knowledge, 
people and technologies easier, flattening the 
world of research, these ethics-free zones present 
an immediate challenge to global governance.
A 2004 report from the British Nuffield Council for 
Bioethics considered issues of collaborative research 
involving developing countries and identified an 
absence of ethical governance as a key concern (69). 
They identify an alienation from European models 
of ethics as contributing to a lack of capacity to 
build their own governance frameworks. What 
they call the ‘bewildering multiplicity of guide-
lines, regulations, declarations and recommenda-
tions on the ethics of research’ can clash with local 
Such stark difference raise questions about the 
extent to which consent can truly informed in a 
Chinese socio-cultural context.
Cultural attitudes towards scientists and physicians 
can also affect the practice of consent. In Europe 
and North America some measure of patient scep-
ticism has become customary with regard to the 
authority of the expert representatives of biomed-
icine. In other cultures where personal connections 
are prized and medicine is still highly paternalistic, 
patients are more likely to believe what they are 
told without question.
Finally, many developing countries have less indi-
vidualistic cultures than is typical in Europe. 
Individuals are likely to be more deeply embedded 
in family and community. In the clinical context it is 
the family that provides patient’s with care and emo-
tional as well as financial support, which means the 
family is also involved in any consent-giving process. 
The subject of consent may be less an individual and 
more the head of a family, clan, village, or tribe. In 
such cases this issue becomes one of ‘family consent’ 
or ‘community consent (67)’. In less individualistic cul-
tures, in which orality may predominate over literacy, 
a person may also resist signing a consent form 
because oral commitments are valued over written 
ones and there is a history of written documents 
being used to harm rather than to help.
Certainly historical research has shown that that the 
practice of science is often quite different from its 
rhetoric, and that science has in non-European 
societies frequently been in the service of an 
exploitative nationalism. Claims for the universality 
67 L. O. Gostin, ‘Informed Consent, Cultural Sensitivity and Respect for Persons’, Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 274, no. 10 (13 Sept. 1995), pp. 844-845.
68  See, for example, Sheila Jasanoﬀ , Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
69  ‘The Ethics of Research Related to Healthcare in Developing Countries.’ a follow-up Discussion Paper based on the workshop held in Cape Town, 
South Africa 12-14th February 2004.
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Science divides
At the global level, the most visible challenge to 
governance and systems of ethics is that of global 
equity. Talk of ‘science divides’ in the context of glo-
bal governance seems strange, given long held 
assumptions that scientific advances aim at, or have 
the effect of, bridging the gap between rich and 
poor, developed and developing worlds. In his 
famous lecture on science The Two Cultures, C.P. 
Snow saw the global divide between rich and poor 
as a challenge that the ability of science would be 
erased within half a century. He predicted, of global 
poverty, that “whatever else in the world we know 
survives to the year 2000, that won’t (71).” 
The reality, of course, is that the gap has grown 
wider over the years. The divergence between 
developed and developing worlds has a number 
of causes, related to the complexity of science, 
innovation and their global governance. There has 
been plenty of analysis of what are often called 
‘technological divides,’ looking at access to tech-
nologies, the distribution of technological benefits 
and risks, and the capacity to innovate. The diag-
nosis is pretty clear. According to one observer, one 
third of the world population is neither able to pro-
duced its own technological innovations nor have 
access to the technologies developed by others. 
Yet science and technology themselves provide no 
easy answers. Only at a global level can governance 
structures begin to change systems of research and 
innovation so that they address global goals, with 
one potential resting in collaborative research (72). 
beliefs and practices. A lack of ethical engagement 
makes these developing countries vulnerable to 
exploitation (70).  
The existence of ethics-free zones creates room in 
the short term for the importing of unethical 
research. Practices that are banned elsewhere 
might be permitted, explicitly or implicitly, by coun-
tries eager to seize competitive advantage in certain 
research areas. Examples have already been docu-
mented of ‘procreative tourism,’ where couples 
travel to another country to obtain egg-donation 
or surrogate mothers, ‘organ tourism,’ where peo-
ple travel to other countries to have an organ 
transplantation they cannot have in their own 
country and clinical trials taking place in develop-
ing countries without proper consent. Some have 
commented that the competition for patients may 
create the same regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ that 
has affected other global markets.
Despite efforts such as the EU Charter and the 
UNESCO Declaration, ethics-free-zones will con-
tinue to exist. The challenge, which can only be 
met globally, is to diminish their number and 
impact, ensuring adequate protection for indi-
viduals as part of a global approach to ethical 
governance. The task is twofold: first, to ensure that 
that international harmonisation of ethical princi-
ples takes on board local concerns while clarifying 
widely-accepted principles and practices; and 
second, to build the capacity of order developing 
countries in ethical governance so that they can 
scrutinise and review protocols.
70   See, e.g., the case of AZT trials in Uganda, which took place without any discussion of post trial availability of the drug to the participants or the community, and the drugs 
were later determined too expensive. Ruth Macklin, ‘After Helsinki: Unresolved Issues in International Research,’ Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, vol. 11, no. 1 (March 2001), 
pp. 17-36.
71 C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientiﬁ c Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959).
72  Michael J. Malinowski, Biotechnology: Law, Business, and Regulation (Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen Publishers, 1999).
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south aiming for a dialogue that would build capac-
ity for developing national programmes that think 
globally. The process was a joint initiative of the 
governments of Finland and Tanzania. It was 
launched in 2003 as a response to the call for 
a forum to facilitate multi-stakeholder dialogue 
on the possibilities offered and challenges posed 
by processes of globalisation. Its remit was broad 
– development, peace, security, environment and 
human rights, but its achievements provide some 
insight for science and development globally. The 
process developed a new model for North–South 
multi-stakeholder cooperation in global problem 
solving and mobilised the necessary political will 
to implement the proposals. Their conclusion pro-
vides a manifesto for global governance. “multi-
stakeholder cooperation is not just a methodology 
for action: it is the realpolitik of the globalised era to 
recognise that lasting solutions to a given problem 
can only be found when all the actors affected by 
a given issue and all the actors capable of impact-
ing that issue are included in the search (76).”  
The proposals on governance are worth highlight-
ing here:
1.  There is a need to bring about a paradigm shift 
by linking the rich and the poor, the global and 
the local, the grass roots and governments.
2.  It is important to strengthen cooperation 
between different stakeholders in governing 
globalization. Particularly, it is important to find 
a common platform since it is very difficult to 
forge cooperation, e.g., between civil society 
One leading thinker on issues of science and devel-
opment notes, however, that while collaboration 
has huge potential benefits, it is often interrupted 
by an overemphasis on the protection of IPR (73). 
Collaborative initiatives are already underway in 
specific areas insofar as stakeholders are able to 
approach the issue of technological divides prag-
matically, starting with what they know, in specific 
fields in science. At the University of Toronto, for 
instance, the Canadian Programme on Genetics 
and Global Health has proposed the establishment 
of Global Genomic Initiative (GGI) to address the 
‘genomics divide.’ One suggestion under this pro-
gramme is that genomics knowledge should be 
considered as a global public good, similar to the 
status given to biodiversity or the ozone layer, in 
contrast to the growing privatisation of genomic 
knowledge taking place across the Western 
world (74). The proposed GGI is intended to provide 
a system of global governance, while boosting the 
biotechnology capacity of poor countries, and 
leading the development of ethics policies. The ini-
tiative would consist of a network of researchers, 
government staff, non-governmental organiza-
tions, and citizens groups.
Current initiatives notwithstanding, the recent 
Helsinki Process has explored the prospects of 
bridging global divides through inclusive govern-
ance. It has clearly shown the need to address 
concerns related to scientific and technological 
divides holistically, looking at systems of science 
and global cooperation (75). The Helsinki Process 
brought together stakeholders from the north and 
73   Calestous Juma, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Globalization: Implications for Developing Countries,’ Science, Technology and Innovation Program, Discussion Paper No. 4, 
Center for International Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1999).
74   Tara Acharya, Abdallah S. Daar, Halla Thorsteinsdóttir, Elizabeth Dowdeswell, and Peter A. Singer, ‘Strengthening the Role of Genomics in Global Health,’ 
PLoS Medicine, vol. 1, no. 3 (Dec. 2004), pp. 195-197.
75  Final report of the Helsinki process on globalization and democracy: a case for multi stakeholder cooperation (September 2008). Available at 
http://www.helsinkiprocess.ﬁ /netcomm/ImgLib/33/257/HP08_report_web.pdf 
76  Helsinki process Secretariat (February 2008), ‘Inclusive Governance – Bridging Global Divides’ (27th–29th November 2007, Dar es Salaam).
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Rwanda provides an interesting example of a bold 
approach to science-led development. The Rwan-
dese approach has been to develop a policy aimed 
at improving skills and knowledge among the pop-
ulation; maintaining the viability of and enhancing 
opportunities for growth in rural areas; and inte-
grating technical education with commerce, 
industry, and the private sector.  This policy was 
converted into detailed, specific programs with 
help from the World Bank (78). 
The Network of African Science Academies (NASAC) 
propose an approach to scientific capacity building 
that mixes elements of health competition – such 
as the nurturing of world-class universities in each 
country – with large doses of international coop-
eration, among African countries and with 
developing and developed countries across the 
world (79). 
Capacity building for science needs to also include 
capacity building for governance, to provide a strong 
foundation for collaborative research. The Pan-African 
Bioethics Initiative (PABIN) is one such effort to build 
capacity for ethical governance. Its approach to 
capacity building is to involve international agencies 
such as UNESCO to assist in matters of training and 
WIPO in intellectual property rights.
Conclusion: Science in 
the globalizing society
This chapter has described rapid changes in the 
way that increasingly powerful science is under-
movements which are anti-globalization and 
business interest groups which are pro-globali-
zation.
3.  There is a need to multi-stakeholder cooperation 
in international and regional organizations.
Implementing such proposals, and building genu-
inely collaborative global science, clearly requires 
a degree of capacity building. The global govern-
ance of science needs to pay close attention to the 
capacity for different countries and regions to drive 
and control science and innovation.
Capacity building 
in the developing world
The divide between rich and poor countries on sci-
ence is one of access, ownership and control, but 
it is also one of capacity – to research, innovate and 
educate. According to one analysis, the challenge 
of capacity building needs to be met with a clear 
approach based around: (77) 
•  Investing in centres of excellence as a way of devel-
oping high-calibre national research capability;
•  Supporting innovation at the village level by nur-
turing local cottage industries, which are as 
important as large industrial initiatives; and
•  Building networks should to link the small enter-
prises at the village level. This will help towards the 
effort of building human resources and capital.
77  Juma, C., Fang, K., Honca, D., Huete-Perez, J., Konde, V., Lee, S.H., Arenas, J., Ivinson, A.,Robinson, H. and Singh, S. (2001) ‘Global governance of technology: meeting the needs 
of developing countries’, Int. J. Technology Management, Vol. 22, Nos. 7/8, pp.629–655. 
78   Alfred J. Watkins and Anubha Verma, eds, (2008). Building Science, Technology and Innovation Capacity in Rwanda: Developing Practical Solutions to Practical Problems. 
(Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/the World Bank, 2008).
79   Joint Statement to African Science Ministers and Heads of States and Governments by the Network of African Science Academies (NASAC): ‘Building Science, 
Technology and Innovative Capacities in Africa.’
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between rich and poor countries. Only at a global 
level will we be able to link the various actors and 
stakeholders required to broaden technological 
access and control and innovation capacity.
As institutions involved with global governance 
addresses questions of science’s ethical dimensions 
and its connections with society, they must strike 
a balance between paternalism and irresponsibility. 
Global governance needs to aim at agreeing and 
harmonising general ethical principles, stamping 
out ethics free zones that still remain. But it must 
also take into account local cultures, religions and 
traditions as a vital part of the necessary dialogue. 
This dialogue should take an approach of recon-
ciliation, building capacity for the management of 
tensions and conflicts that are an inevitable part of 
collaborative global science.
stood and questioned by various stakeholders. 
Science, especially biomedicine, asks larger and 
larger ethical questions, testing a society’s capacity 
to realise its benefits while minimising its risks. 
Europe has been at the vanguard in establishing 
new structures for ethical governance, all of which 
aim to initiate new forms of dialogue. As science 
globalises, ethical, deliberative governance needs 
to take place globally.
The European Union now needs to build on its 
leadership of such debates in order to learn from 
and extend initiatives such as the Global Ethics 
Forum. It needs to consider how activities that 
currently fall under the heading of ‘science and 
society’ can be scaled up and connected to issues 
of global concern. Global governance is made 
both more important and more complicated by 
science’s historic inability to address divides 
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pean Research Area (ERA), structured around 
policies that would advance science and innova-
tion while strengthening European unity. Two years 
later, in Barcelona, a target was set for R&D expend-
iture, aiming at an EU-wide average of 3 % of GDP, 
from a mix of public and private funding. In 2004, 
however, a working group report evaluated 
progress towards this goal and was highly critical: 
“One of the most disappointing aspects of the 
Lisbon strategy to date is that the importance of 
R&D remains so little understood and that so little 
progress has been made (80).” A subsequent report 
reached a similar assessment: “Europe and its citi-
zens should realise that their way of life is under 
threat but also that the path to prosperity through 
research and innovation is open if large scale action 
is taken now by their leaders before it is too late (81).” 
At the same time, however, it is not clear that ERA 
success rests solely with the greater funding of 
science. Rhetorical appeals to ‘innovation’ and 
‘knowledge economies’ can be misleading, empha-
sizing inputs to science and innovation while failing 
to assess outputs and context (82). Science policy 
appeals too often stress competition or ‘keeping 
up’ in terms of inputs rather than collaboration or 
pursuit of the common good, and are wary of all 
regulation – except that devoted to IPR. But the 
good knowledge society is as much about the gov-
ernance of knowledge as it is about producing 
knowledge.
Policy discussions often worry that excessive atten-
tion to the governance of science might hold back 
European science and innovation while the emerg-
ing knowledge economies of China and India forge 
Chapter 4. 
Conclusions and 
Recommendations: 
Towards a Vision of 
Global Governance
Having reflected on issues related to the global 
governance of science from the perspectives of 
the society of science and of science in society, 
it is appropriate to summarize our conclusions. 
Following these conclusions, we venture a brief 
set of recommendations, moving from science 
to European engagement and potential contribu-
tions to global governance. Both conclusions and 
recommendations remain grounded in a belief 
which has animated this report from the begin-
ning, that European experience is of significance to 
the global community, and in an emerging vision 
for a multi-levelled global governance of science.
Conclusions: 
From Europe to the world
In 2000, the European Union adopted the Lisbon 
strategy for growth, aiming to create ‘the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based econ-
omy in the world’ by the end of the decade. A key 
means to this goal was establishment of the Euro-
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and Society Directorate of DG Research, European 
Commission) in promoting vital discussions that will 
advance collaborative understandings of science 
and global governance. It is our belief that two sets 
of European values can be foundational to such 
discussions:
1.  the principles identified by the European Union 
as vital for governance – proportionality and sub-
sidiarity as extended in openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence; 
2.  the fundamental rights of the European Union 
– as summarized under the headings of dignity, 
freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens rights and 
justice.
Both sets of values provide the basis for enhancing 
global governance of science within the ERA and 
for taking the search for global governance beyond 
Europe itself – for the common benefit of Europe 
and the globalizing world.
To this end, our report has considered the role of 
what we called the society of science in reimagin-
ing governance systems. The contribution of 
scientists themselves, as individuals and as mem-
bers of institutions, is crucial. Science, as a globally 
networked activity, provides an unparalleled loca-
tion in which to begin debates that necessarily 
cross disciplinary and national boundaries. Debates 
about science within the global scientific commu-
nity open up new discussions that are closed down 
by narrow policies of techno-nationalism. But 
debates within the scientific community must also 
reflect the external context of science. The activities 
of scientists resist close management, but they are 
amenable to the influence of governance. Systems 
of ethical governance, for instance, now need to 
open up to operate globally and early experiments 
ahead, unencumbered by such considerations. But 
we should resist such myths of the ‘wild East’ in the 
way we think about global science. Seeing China 
and India solely as fast-moving, unregulated com-
petitors fundamentally affects how we construct 
governance processes. This is a counsel of fear, lead-
ing to a ‘race to the bottom’ for scientific, regulatory 
and environmental standards.
Instead of seeing Europe’s progress towards a more 
democratic governance of science as a barrier to 
our success in the global knowledge economy, we 
should consider how it might become a different 
form of advantage, opening up new opportunities 
for innovation. Looking beyond Europe, our goal 
should be to explore different processes of govern-
ance, ethics and public deliberation to see what we 
might exchange, import or export. We need to 
develop networks which allow policymakers and 
scientists in Europe to forge common purpose and 
alliances on these issues with their counterparts in 
emerging economies.
It may well be that a European competitive advan-
tage rests as much if not more with its institutions 
of social management, its principles and ideals, its 
creative and critical reflection on the governance 
of science as on the production of scientific knowl-
edge. Indeed, the construction of systems for the 
global governance of science is vital if science is to 
realise its potential and contribute to the solution 
of global problems. Additionally, this governance 
needs to involve proactive efforts from a range of 
actors at multiple levels across science as a whole 
and through the engagement of many participants 
in all countries where science is to prosper – internal 
and external, bottom up and top down.
Our hope is that this report may be able to assist 
the Governance and Ethics Unit (Science, Economy 
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83  For further discussion of this point, see ‘From Science and Society To Science In Society: Towards a Framework for “Co-Operative Research”,’ Report of a European Commission 
Workshop, rapporteur Andy Stirling (Brussels: European Commission, 2005).
The building of systems for global governance 
cannot be immediate. The process is necessarily 
evolutionary, involving aspects of social learning, 
exchange and experimentation. We cannot expect 
change overnight, but our hope is that this report 
helps to clarify the necessary direction in which 
global governance must travel.
Modelling a reconciliation 
approach
Much of our report has focussed on the need for 
deliberative ethical governance of science at vari-
ous levels. But given divergent approaches to 
ethics around the world, how might global govern-
ance proceed? How can European experience best 
be shared with the global world? We think it is use-
ful to compare three approaches: fundamentalist, 
modernist and reconciliationist. Although each is 
to some degree an exaggerated model, a compar-
ison may nonetheless be helpful in pointing towards 
a new ideal.
First, a fundamentalist approach involves a total 
commitment to the beliefs and values of any 
traditional culture in which scientific research is 
conducted. The ideal here is that science should 
remain subordinate to a historical culture. But a fun-
damentalist attitude could easily violate internation-
al and European guidelines on research ethics and 
put European researchers in the position of being 
unable to protect the rights and welfare of human 
subjects. While it might allow for developing coun-
tries to build their own scientific capacities, in the 
long term fundamentalism is likely to mean that 
collaborative research becomes impossible for 
European scientists and institutions.
to democratise the governance of science need to 
connect more directly with policymaking (83). 
Indeed, although at the present there are few if any 
global institutions sufficiently robust to globally 
govern science and innovation, among the impor-
tant institutions on which one might build are 
international professional scientific societies (such 
as the International Council of Scientific Unions or 
ICSU and the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science or AAAS), United Nations agencies 
such as UNESCO, international codes of ethics in 
science and engineering, and various regimes for 
the protection of intellectual property. These are 
institutions that the ERA and European efforts are 
well situated to enhance, appealing precisely the 
values of good governance and human rights.
But global governance cannot be limited to scien-
tists alone. Global governance also demands engage-
ment with the larger society in which science exists, 
from the nation state in all its dimensions of public 
and private sectors to international institutions and 
an emerging global civil society. Links with the pri-
vate sector need to broaden beyond aspects of 
regulation to encourage companies to contribute 
to the realisation of global goals through global 
science. In addition, science needs to become 
responsive to the bottom-up values of public 
groups and be encouraged to play its own role in 
an emerging international civil society. New mech-
anisms for multi-stakeholder corporation will not 
provide a miracle cure for global governance. They 
may even make the challenge of governance more 
complex. But the challenges simply cannot be suc-
cessfully tackled without the involvement of all rel-
evant stakeholders, even if this requires additional 
complexity.
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allowing us to see, and adjust the peripheral parts 
of informed consent.
Peripheral aspects include the ways in which infor-
mation is disclosed (using written materials or 
video), the ways patients or participants express 
consent (written form with signature or orally with 
a witness), and how the wordings are used in con-
sent forms (whether using the wordings ‘research’ 
or ‘experiment’) or family and community involve-
ment in the process of informed consent. These 
aspects should be adjustable to culture and local 
context. 
But this example perhaps over simplifies the issue; 
the reconciliation approach will not be easy. The 
implementation of a reconciliation approach to 
cross-cultural research ethics will raise many diffi-
cult issues. Important distinctions will need to be 
clarified, such as the difference between scientific 
research (including clinical trials) and medical care. 
The involvement of family individual consent may 
in some cases abridge respect for privacy or other 
values. In addition to questions of values, global 
ethical governance will need to consider issues of 
possibility and prudence in crossing diverse social 
boundaries. Different countries will have different 
policy, regulation and enforcement systems, and 
governance frameworks need to consider how 
such can be accommodated. As one bioethics pol-
icy adviser noted in reference to his own experience 
in considering connections between bioethical 
principles and actual policymaking, it is a matter of 
prudence “which moral imperatives that arise out 
of the study and consideration of bioethical issues 
should be reflected in public policies that govern 
us (84).” As he comments further: “No set of abstract 
rules can be expected to satisfy the particular con-
tingencies represented by the cultural traditions 
At the other end of the spectrum, a modernist 
approach entails total commitment to European 
scientific cultural values, as embodied in European 
research ethics guidelines, completely disregarding 
the beliefs and values in non-European societies. 
The ideal here is that science as conceived and 
practiced in Europe should dominate all other cul-
tures into which it might be introduced. This 
attitude, by ignoring any positive roles played by 
aspects of local culture, will exacerbate existing ten-
sions and, again, in the long term, undermine 
opportunities for collaboration.
Given the unacceptability of these two extremes, 
an alternative might be described as reconcilia-
tionist. A search for reconciliation would seek to 
implement European scientific practices and guide-
lines on research ethics while respecting local values 
and trying to assimilate positive elements of local 
cultures into cooperative projects. To have science 
that is ethically bound both by European and non-
European values, we will need, for instance, to 
identify the core of the principle of informed con-
sent, as one of the major pillars of European 
biomedical research for the protection of human 
participants, and discover ways to practice it that 
harmonise and even enhance local cultural values.
The core of the principle of informed consent con-
sists of, first, faithfully disclosing information 
adequate for patients or human research partici-
pants to make decisions without distortion, 
covering-up or deceit; second, actively helping 
them to understand the information provided; and 
third, upholding free consent without undue 
inducement and coercion insofar as people are 
competent to make decisions or proxy consent 
when they lack full competency. This core provides 
a starting point for taking ethics across cultures, 
84 Harold T. Shapiro, ‘Reﬂ ections on the Interface of Bioethics, Public Policy and Science,’ Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, vol.  9, no. 3 (Sept. 1999), pp. 209-224.
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ingly tied to social and economic needs. At the same 
time the unintended consequences innovation have 
presented society with new challenges and risks 
amplifying demands that the pursuit of science 
better reflects social concerns.
As a location for global governance, the society of 
science tends to be concerned with the means 
rather than the ends of science, with an emphasis 
on avoiding fraud and misconduct, raising aware-
ness of other questionable research practices and 
education in the ideals of the responsible conduct of 
research. Given that we judge this, however, limited, 
a good thing, our first recommendation is that:
  RECOMMENDATION 1: Within the society 
of science, practices of ethical governance 
should be promoted – by e.g., grant activity 
requirements, educational programmes, 
research projects and related conferences 
or other appropriate means.
Internal efforts at ethical global governance – mean-
ing, the ethical governance of science as a whole 
– are to be commended and supported with all 
appropriate measures by the larger society in which 
science necessarily exists.
At the same time, although the pursuit of a suitable 
global governance of science properly begins with 
appreciation of the internal governance of its 
means and methods, this is not enough. In a world 
of competing goods and limited resources – in 
which science is not the only good and all research 
programmes are not equally able to be funded – 
the governance of means must be complemented 
by a governance of ends.  Thus, our second recom-
mendation is that:
and uncertainties that must be accommodated in 
real public policies… collective rules of conduct 
must be constantly reviewed and perhaps revised 
and updated.” We should therefore recognize that 
the approach of reconciliation should be one of fos-
tering global dialogue not just on principles but also 
on their application. It is our belief that grounds for 
agreement can be found despite local differences 
in emphasis on certain values or definitions of prob-
lems. But we should not pretend that this is easy, 
given that such dialogue tends to scrutinize the 
political control of science, inviting broad stakehold-
er interest. In such cases, too strong an emphasis on 
consensus can, as others have observed, “lead to 
underestimation of risks and objections, ignoring of 
unpopular viewpoints, or failure to consider alterna-
tives or additional information (85).” 
Recommendations: In the 
name of global governance
Our analysis of the needs and opportunities for the 
global governance of science began by adopting 
a general conception of science as a social institution 
that produces knowledge oriented towards action 
and identifying two senses of global governance: 
comprehensive and international. In the context of 
international relations, ‘global governance’ empha-
sizes the influence of non-state actors and is thus 
peculiarly relevant to science, which is governed 
internally by members of the society of science and 
externally through interactions with the larger 
society that encompasses science. In both cases, 
science has since the end of World War II been 
undergoing changes that have intensified the prac-
tices of and need for global governance. As science 
has become progressively dependent on economic 
support from society, its outputs have been increas-
85    Ruth Ellen Bulger, Elizabeth Meyer Bobby, and Harvey V. Fineberg, eds., Society’s Choices: Social and Ethical Decision Making in Biomedicine 
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995).
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Within Europe it is also important to pay particular 
attention to the European Research Area as a kind 
of laboratory for exploring opportunities to prac-
tice the global governance of science. With this in 
mind, we recommend that:
  RECOMMENDATION 4: All ERA research 
projects, including collaborations with scientists 
in other countries, should seek ways to enact 
basic fundamental rights of dignity, freedom, 
equality, solidarity, citizens’ rights, and justice in 
ways that also seek to respect and learn from 
the social and cultural contexts of non-Euro-
peans – by, e.g., expert and public deliberations 
that develop and apply ideals of reconciliation.
When fostering such basic fundamental rights, 
it is crucial not to simply apply such rights in any 
formulaic or non-thinking manner. There are 
general issues of the place of science in society 
that call for careful reflection. Thus, we further 
recommend that:
  RECOMMENDATION 5: ERA research should 
be developed to promote critical reflection and 
discussion with regard to both the means and 
ends of science – by means, e.g., of selective 
research projects and public activities that 
require interdisciplinary collaboration and 
citizen participation, including reflection of the 
ways in which the principles of European 
governance and basic fundamental rights 
serve as appropriate and applicable guidelines 
for the practice of science.
  RECOMMENDATION 2: Members of the 
society of science should be encouraged 
to become self-critical – by, e.g., required 
collaboration with complementary disciplines 
and non-scientists in order to better recognize 
the ways they are influenced by larger social 
contexts.
That is, scientists, as researchers and as citizens, 
should be encouraged to reflect on the ends of 
science as well as the means. One effective way to 
promote such reflection is by means of what might 
be called broad interdisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity 
not just among scientists but interdisciplinarity that 
involves social scientists, historians, philosophers, 
and other disciplines.
Additionally, as one way to dilute the impact of lim-
ited self-interests upon science, we recommend 
that:
  RECOMMENDATION 3: All scientists should 
be required to make the results of their 
research as widely available as possible – by 
adoption of open access publication protocols.
The results of science should be made as widely 
available as possible by adoption of open access 
protocols of publication, since open access is most 
likely able to enhance wide reflection both within 
and without science on science and the common 
good. Open access would further benefit the shar-
ing of science and scientific collaborations between 
developed and developing countries.
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With regard to the place of science in society, it is 
clear that another evolution has taken place: from 
one-way communication by scientific experts to 
society towards two-way deliberation between sci-
entists and members of the non-scientific public. 
As science, especially biomedicine, raises larger and 
larger ethical questions, testing the abilities of soci-
ety to adjust to its implications and make measured 
use of its promises, risk has become a major topic 
of reflection. Europe has taken a leadership role in 
seeking to establish appropriate societal govern-
ance structures, emphasizing repeatedly the need 
for science-society dialogue. But as science glo-
balises, ethical, deliberative governance needs to 
take place globally. To this end, we further recom-
mend that:
  RECOMMENDATION 6: The European Union 
should seek to extend to the global level its 
leadership in working to harmonise the inter-
nal and external governance of science across 
national boundaries – by furthering research 
and discussion on the global governance of 
science and seeking to develop appropriate 
protocols and their application for global 
collaboration.
All six recommendations thus point towards deep-
ening global governance within the ERA and 
extending global governance beyond the Europe-
an context. The goal is to seek ways to share 
European aspirations and experience in regard to 
the governance of science with the global world 
itself – for the common good of both Europe and 
the world, learning from while contributing to and 
with those who are becoming collaborators in the 
globalization process. 
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